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For those of us with a commitment to a republican Australia, this monograph 
presents a fresh approach.  In developing its framework for constitutional 
reform, it draws on a range of ideas – not only republican, but Indigenous, 
feminist, and religious thinking as well.
As an Indigenous Australian I am very committed to reform within Australian 
political institutions.  In my former role as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner I facilitated a reform agenda that ultimately led to 
the formation of the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples. The abolition 
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2004 left 
Indigenous Australians without an institutional mechanism to represent our 
interests at a national and international levels. This event also gave cause to 
some considerable soul searching within the Indigenous polity. It was clear that 
Indigenous Australians wanted an institutional mechanism that would represent 
our interests. There was also much debate about how this might be developed 
and much to be learnt from the apparent flaws both in earlier attempts to achieve 
this vision – including the ATSIC model and a contemporary, government 
selected and appointed, Indigenous advisory body.
Our approach to the development of the three-chamber model for the National 
Congress for Australia’s First Peoples was in the first instance framed by Article 
18 of the United Nations Declaration which mandates that Indigenous peoples 
should have a determining role in the development of political structures to 
represent their interests. There were a number of principles that informed 
the design of the National Congress. There were, for example, the problems 
that can arise with low participation in voluntary elections and the need to 
ensure a capable representative structure with Indigenous accountabilities. 
Such accountabilities include gender equality, open and transparent two-way 
communications between the people and the Congress, adoption of an ethics 
monitoring mechanism and adoption of guiding principles.  In developing this 
model we aimed to take advantage of existing Indigenous structures without 
comprising their political integrity. I believe that it is a unique model and I 
am very pleased that it has in some way influenced Power’s thinking on the 
challenging but important issues explored in this book.
Of course, few people will agree with everything Power has to say.  I, for one, 
remain more optimistic than he is about the prospects of attaining a republic in 
our lifetimes.  Nevertheless, he alerts us to the need for the great deal of hard 
work and further dialogue before we can gain a genuinely republican nation. 
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In the process of doing this hard work, we should be able to advance on other 
fronts as well.  For example, I can now see new ways in which the cause of 
reconciliation could be furthered as we progress to the republic: for example, 
if only our governments followed Power’s advice on fiducial governance and 
adopted explicit policies and practices aimed at enhancing public trust in them! 
Should they commit to doing this, it would be far from fanciful to hope that our 
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I have written this monograph for my grandchildren, in the hope that it might 
assist them and their generation in the securing of a worthwhile republic in 
Australia before the end of this century.
For helpful comments during the long period of gestation of this monograph, I 
wish to thank Ian Anderson, Peter Boyce, John Burke, Glyn Davis, Tom Davis, 
Grant Duncan, Geoff Gallop, Bob Gregory, John Halligan, Toby Halligan, 
Harshan Kumarasingham, David Latimer, the late Richard McGarvie, John 
Nethercote, Marcus Power, Jenny Stewart, John Wanna, John Warhurst and 
Roger Wettenhall.
My greatest debt is to Ann Morrow, who scrutinised the entire draft and made 
many helpful suggestions.
Finally, my thanks are due to the University of Melbourne, which provided a 
well-equipped office and access to library services throughout the work on this 
project. I would also like to record my appreciation of the professional way in 
which my manuscript has been edited for publication by Jan Borrie and John 
Butcher’s assistance and advice in relation to the publication process.
Anyone scanning the list of aforementioned colleagues will soon realise that 
there are many points at which most of them would disagree with my argument. 
They have all, however, provided me with useful feedback. All deficiencies of 




Reinventing parliamentary democracy for a differentiated polity in 
the twenty-first century is a task scarcely begun, in either theory or 
practice…It is perhaps more a wonder, given the shackles they wear, 
that leaders achieve anything at all. (Rhodes 1997:222)
When an earlier draft of some of this monograph was circulated to two readers—
both of whom I respect for their different mixes of academic and practical 
skills—the feedback I received was encouraging but concerning. Both readers 
considered that my argument was a weighty one but so ‘out of left field’ that it 
would be difficult to attract a wide audience of concerned citizens to consider 
my proposals. So the purpose of this brief preface is to present some of the key 
points in what follows in this monograph, in the hope that it might encourage 
perseverance among readers who might otherwise be put off by my introduction 
and theoretical framework-setting Section 1. Alternatively, those readers who 
are interested mainly in the ways in which Australia could best proceed to a 
republican regime might prefer to go straight to Section 2.
a) The Geertzian challenge
I am here attempting to respond to a challenge issued some years ago by the 
eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz. A few years before his death, Geertz 
threw down the gauntlet to political theorists wishing to embark on the design 
of governance regimes suited to the new millennium. In his stimulating essay 
‘The world in pieces: culture and politics at the end of the century’, Geertz 
(2000:235) emphasised the ‘disassembly of the bipolar world’ with an increasingly 
messy and uneven multiculturalism cutting across national boundaries. In his 
view, a new form of politics was needed (Geertz 2000:245), and a new form 
of political theorising to accompany it. This new form of theorising should 
eschew over-hasty generalisation and should flow from concerns with existing 
institutions and practices and their inadequacies. He convincingly contended 
that all the major writers in the grand tradition of political theorising—from 
Plato to Rousseau—had been creatively stimulated by the pressing nature of the 
problems faced by the regimes in which they lived (Geertz 2000:219). 
One of Rousseau’s contemporaries—the governance practitioner and theorist 
Montesquieu—has proven to be the most heavily influential thinker on modern 
constitution making, so much so that some of his most important propositions 
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have become deeply embedded in the contemporary republican assumptive 
world. It is therefore appropriate for me to begin my response to the Geertzian 
challenge with a brief critique of a key Montesquieu proposition. In this 
way, I shall attempt to illustrate what I consider should be one of the most 
important features of republican thinking—the constant questioning of key 
assumptions—while at the same time setting an important part of the context 
for the argument that follows.
b) Questioning Montesquieu
In his extremely influential work The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu (1748) 
made one error that was to have a great impact on subsequent constitutional 
theorising. Because of his own monarchist allegiance, Montesquieu was 
insufficiently sensitive to the consequences of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
the previous century. He thus confused the formalities with the realities and 
placed the monarch at the head of the Executive—one of his three divisions of 
government.1 Had he been more fully aware of the real distribution of power 
in the eighteenth-century British regime, he might have paid closer attention 
to the role of the head of state, as distinguished from that of the real head of 
government. 
When the American founding fathers came to adapt the Montesquieu framework 
for a new republic, they were content to replace what they believed to have 
1 Although Montesquieu did not use the term ‘branch’, it has consistently appeared in glosses on the US 
constitution, with consequences that I consider to have been significant. I thus disagree with Rohr (1995:39), 
who considers the modern preference for the term (over, for example, the previously favoured ‘department’) 
as being little more than a change in fashion. In this case, I contend, the term ‘branch’ does carry important 
connotations, for it can be used—in ways seemingly not open to other terms—to legitimise hegemony over a 
major sector of modern governance. The establishment of this hegemony could initially have been due to its 
very trinitarian structure. After rejecting a seventeenth-century view that the durability of this structure was 
due to its having ‘shadowed’ the structure of the Christian deity, Vile (1967:15) immediately goes on to remark 
on the ‘mystical’ quality it has acquired. I have not yet been able to determine how this terminology came to 
be dominant. The Oxford English Dictionary cites the earliest use of the term in the early eighteenth century. 
In 1712, in The Spectator (no. 287), Joseph Addison wrote that ancient sages such as Polybius and Cicero ‘gave 
the Pre-eminence to a mixt Government, consisting of three Branches, the Regal, the Noble, and the Popular’. 
Addison went on to warn that ‘a greater number (than four Branches) would cause too much confusion’. We 
need the services of an intellectual historian of the skill of Hirschman to chart the evolution of this term. Some 
time ago, much of the relevant material was gathered by Vile (1967), except he, like Rohr, was insufficiently 
aware of the political weight that accrues to interests once they have succeeded in laying claim to the rubric of 
‘branch’. He does, however, at one point draw attention to the need to consider closely—as no less a thinker 
than Locke had done under the rubric of a ‘federative’ function—the attractiveness of another branch: ‘Locke 
and others had been bothered by the fact that the “ruler”…had to carry out the law when it was clear and 
easily stated, principally in internal affairs, but he had also to act in areas where the law could not be laid 
down in detail and where his prerogative must remain almost wholly untrammeled, that is to say largely in 
external affairs. Thus between them Locke and Montesquieu state at least four functions of government, not 
three: the legislative, the executive, the “prerogative”, and the judicial’ (Vile 1967:87). In this monograph, I 
am contending that this prerogative power be revived under the aegis of the head of state, and broadened in 
scope, so as to serve a monitory function.
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been an executive monarchy with an executive president. As Vile (1967:121) 
has pointed out, this was all too easy for them to do, for the colonial governors, 
with whom most of them had tangled, possessed powers close to those that 
Montesquieu had falsely attributed to the monarch. From its inception in this 
way, the head-of-state role in the United States has been subordinated to that of 
the head of government, which has in turn become determined by the outcomes 
of partisan elections. So much for the independence of the head of state in 
presidential regimes. 
In the other form of regime that came to prominence in the twentieth century—
the parliamentarist—the threefold Montesquieu differentiation of branches has 
come to be adopted uncritically, except that it has always been apparent to those 
involved in these regimes that the head of state could no longer be considered 
the head of government. As a result, only a small space could be found in the 
Montesquieu trinity for the head of state. Heads of state in parliamentarist 
regimes might have become more independent of partisan politics than 
they have been in presidential regimes, but they have done so at the cost of 
marginalisation. At no point has the question been posed: should the head of 
state be accorded the status of playing a leading role in a separate branch of 
governance? 
c) On fiducial governance
It will by now be apparent that if I am to take up the Geertzian challenge in 
the context of Australian republicanism, I shall have to work out of ‘left field’, 
for the mainstream has become stalled by Montesquieu orthodoxies; hence 
my resort to a near-neologism in the very title of this monograph. By ‘fiducial 
governance’, I mean a commitment by our nation-state to adopt policies and 
arrange institutional relations in ways that demonstrably strengthen the trust 
of the citizenry in its institutions of governance. If this commitment is made 
and followed through, it will end up generating a strong—indeed, in my view, 
ultimately irresistible—movement to a republican order in Australia. 
Composing this monograph out of left field will inevitably open me to charges of 
elitism, in the sense that I shall at some key points be directing complex arguments 
at governance elites. Such an orientation cannot be avoided, however, as I am 
seeking to encourage a substantial change in the culture of constitutional reform 
in Australia. I am seeking to remedy a state of affairs that has been described 
by Irving (2009:118): ‘The republic campaign generated a body of theoretical 
work, but did not engage deeply with questions of constitutionalism. The bill 
of rights issue looks likely to be similar. The focus in such themes has tended to 
be practical, rather than conceptual or analytical.’ 
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In order to do this, I am exploring some important structural changes to our 
current machinery of government arrangements—to provide institutional room, 
as it were, for governance practitioners to begin the work that will produce the 
needed cultural transformations. Only when these changes—both cultural and 
structural—have been effected will it be possible for political activists, with 
skills I do not possess, to craft proposals for concrete changes that will stand 
good chances of popular approval through a referendum.
A genuine government commitment to fiducial governance will result in a 
wide-ranging reform program; there are serious problems that require attention 
and the very process of implementing reforms will in time make it easier to 
secure public approval in a public referendum on constitutional changes. As 
the late former Senator David Hamer—that shrewd political practitioner—
observed about the most promising way of achieving constitutional reform in 
the Australian system: 
If…there could be a working period with the new rules before there 
was any need to include the rules in the various constitutions, by this 
time they would be accepted practice, and the conservatism of the 
voters on constitutional matters would be recruited on the side of their 
acceptance. (Hamer 1994:83)
The character of this monograph is therefore tentative and contingent in tone. It 
is too early to make confident judgments about the nature of the constitutional 
reforms that might ultimately be needed. It is possible, however, to outline 
a framework within which new collegial bodies can begin the needed work 
without any prior constitutional recognition.
There are important further dimensions to fiducial governance than just the 
advancement of the trustworthiness of public institutions—vital as that might 
be. Often, the most effective way forward is to follow the famous injunction 
of Braithwaite (1998): ‘Institutionalise distrust; enculturate trust.’ For this 
reason, it is of the utmost importance for regime stability that new institutional 
arrangements (whether they be for the establishment—in recent times, strongly 
advocated—of an integrity branch, or, as I would prefer it to be titled, a monitory 
branch) be designed in ways that prevent corruption before it occurs (Brown 
2008:46). And, if this is to occur, the trust that underpins fiducial governance 
must be especially strong between those officials who are heading up the several 
monitory units that are being brought together in the new branch.
The term ‘fiducial’ has close connections with other terms in wider use, such 
as ‘consensual’ and ‘consociational’.2 ‘Fiducial’, however, can be differentiated 
2 The term derives from the cognate Latin term ‘fides’ (trust) and has until now not been used in governance 
contexts, its current use being restricted largely to physics and theology. It is thus free of the legal and 
sometimes confusing connotations of the more familiar term ‘fiduciary’.
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from the others because of its emphasis on the close interrelations between 
leaders and the citizenry. All such terms are readily distinguishable from that 
which is most commonly used to describe democratic politics: the ‘partisan’. 
Parties lie at the heart of modern representative democracies, but parties alone 
cannot deliver good governance. Party politicians often engage in politics other 
than the partisan; much of the time of many parliamentarians is devoted to non-
partisan committee work (Halligan et al. 2007:ch.8). The distinctive feature of 
such contemporary fiducial politics when it is compared with the partisan form 
is, however, its fragmented and largely unorganised nature. It is this relative 
lack of coherence that has determined the lack of success to date of calls for the 
recognition of an integrity branch—that is, a formation that in my terms would 
focus primarily on fiducial politics. As I shall argue, the boundaries between the 
two forms of politics would be best determined on a case-by-case basis by the 
members of high-level collegial bodies, of which a majority would be members 
of political parties, but they would be partisans who recognised the need to 
collaborate across party lines with others with strong fiducial commitments.
The reach of fiducial politics therefore extends well beyond the domain of 
political leader–citizen relations, for it must affect the ways in which politicians 
themselves relate to each other. As it does this, it can also lead to a long-overdue 
rejuvenation of the parties themselves. As increasing numbers of citizens come 
to see the opportunities for participation in meaningful discourse about the 
major issues of the day, they will be attracted to parties that offer them the most 
effective ways of so participating.
Anticipating much of the argument that follows, Table P.1 indicates one way in 
which this could be done. Fiducial governance, I shall be contending, is most 
likely when a separate branch is dedicated to the tasks of making public policies 
worthy of the trust of the citizenry, and a monitory branch is well suited to such 
tasks.
























So what are the serious problems that need urgent attention because they have 
been diminishing public trust in our institutions of governance? I begin the first 
section of this monograph by addressing this critical question.
1
Introduction
a) The need for reform
I can most readily provide a simple introduction to what is wrong with the 
current Australian system of governance by listing 10 excellent modern works 
that have called for needed changes in our regime but that seem for the most 
part to have been going nowhere
• Report of the Review of Public Service Personnel Management in Victoria 
(1990)
• Report of the Republic Advisory Committee (1993)
• Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia? (Hamer 1994)
• The Road to a Republic (Parliament of Australia 2004)
• Into the Future: The neglect of the long term in Australian politics (Marsh and 
Yencken 2004)
• Chaos or Coherence: Strengths, opportunities and challenges for Australia’s 
integrity systems – the NISA Report (Griffith University Institute for Ethics, 
Governance and Law and Transparency International 2005)
• An Australian Republic (Barns and Krawec-Wheaton 2006)
• Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The upper house solution? (Aroney et al. 
2008)
• Promoting Integrity: Evaluating and improving public institutions (Head et al. 
2008)
• National Human Rights Consultation Report (Australian Human Rights 
Commission 2009a)
• Choosing the Republic (Patmore 2009)
It is not easy to trace the reasons why these numerous recommendations, which 
I for the most part support and find progressive, have been stalled. Nevertheless, 
the Into the Future essay most readily provides us with several of the most salient 
reasons for its own lack of impact—reasons that are relevant to the others as 
well. Chief among these is the continuing dominance of our highly disciplined 
political parties, which have tightened their hold on the levers of power as their 
community bases have dwindled. The continuing dominance of the parties 
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means that the institution on which Marsh and Yencken pin their hopes—the 
Parliament1—cannot assume the position of centrality envisaged for it by them 
as long as the party system remains unchanged. 
In the assumptive world of Marsh and Yencken, there is no other institution 
available to impose new disciplines on the parties that for so long have imposed 
their own forms of narrow disciplines on policymaking leaders, including 
those in the Parliament itself. To anticipate a central theme in this monograph, 
however: what of a directly elected head of state, seated in a council of state in 
which all the familiar branches of governance were represented? Like all those 
who have concerned themselves with public policymaking in modern Australia, 
Marsh and Yencken do not consider this possibility. 
There has in recent years been some valuable work done by such entities as 
Transparency International and its Australian partners (for example, Griffith 
University 2005; Head et al. 2008). The character of this work has, however, 
been insufficiently political in nature; the proponents of the cause seeking 
the establishment in each of our jurisdictions of an integrity branch have not 
seriously addressed the questions of how structural reforms could generate 
the political support needed for the implementation of their reform proposals. 
Such political support could be developed around the ideal of fiduciality in 
governance—the development of a system that would heighten citizen trust 
in governance while simultaneously not threatening the legitimacy of the 
policy priorities of the government of the day. So we must next examine more 
closely the need for fiduciality, before going on to explore the reasons why the 
considerations raised by this concept have been so little considered in debates 
about our republican future.
The citizenry of Australia, like its counterparts in other similar societies, displays 
a constantly low level of trust in its public institutions (Bean 2005:123–4).
Accordingly, the most careful recent examination of the state of our democracy 
has concluded that the Australian public exhibits ‘disengagement and lack 
of trust in existing representative institutions, from political parties through 
to NGOs’ (Sawer et al. 2009:246). Unsurprisingly, then, Australia has not 
escaped the international trend that has witnessed the steady diminution of 
the membership of the major parties (Sawer et al. 2009:136). And most recent 
surveys show that the majority of Australians do not trust the institutions 
of government (Sawer et al. 2009:149), and an even higher majority believes 
corruption to be unacceptably high, especially in large private sector firms. 
1 In their essay, Marsh and Yencken cite seven overseas institutional initiatives relevant to their concerns. 
Of these, no fewer than five are parliamentary.
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Associated with these ‘disturbing trends’ has been a lack of public confidence in 
the capacity of the legal system to remedy these defects (Braithwaite 2008:185; 
Sawer et al. 2009:41).
What is most disturbing about this state of affairs has been the spread of distrust, 
so that it extends to all the participants—government and non-government—
that have become involved in modern governance.2 Reform policies that are 
aimed only at government institutions will not therefore be sufficient; fiducial 
policies and programs must cover the full range of governance institutions—
public and private.
b) Opening up the assumptive world of the 
republican policy community
Every policy community has its assumptive world—a set of interlocking and 
usually unquestioned assumptions that together help it make some sort of sense 
of the policy domain with which it is concerned. Despite this commonality, policy 
communities differ in terms of the scope of their concerns: the more narrowly 
drawn the boundaries around its domain, the tighter are likely to be the sets of 
assumptions that bind together the participants in that community. Although 
I shall be arguing that the republican spirit should be one that is constantly 
questioning assumptions and imputations, in Australia, the republican policy 
community has been bound tightly by the assumptions of its core agency: the 
Australian Republican Movement (ARM).3
In subjecting these assumptions to critical scrutiny, I am not making assumptions 
of my own about their invalidity. Some of the assumptions made by mainstream 
republicans could turn out to be well grounded. For example, the assumption 
that the two head-of-state offices that currently serve us could conveniently be 
merged into one office could end up being the arrangement that finally comes 
into being. I doubt that it will, but deliberations in one or other of the councils 
of state—whose creation I shall be recommending—might produce agreement 
on a merged head-of-state office. So, while I am not contending that all that is 
2 Indeed, the two least-trusted sets of institutions are, according to Bean (2005:Table 8.3), non-governmental: 
banks and financial institutions and trade unions.
3 Because the domain of the policy community has been so tightly drawn, the ARM has been dominant, 
in a way that it would not have been had the relevant policy community been one that concerned itself with 
broader issues of constitutional reform. This dominance has been so pronounced that I have recently felt 
free to describe it as ‘colonising’ other nearby formations (Power 2008b). Responding to an earlier draft of 
this monograph, one of the readers, who himself had been a leader of the ARM, commented that its strategy 
had been supported by ‘99% of the wider republican movement, including the Australian Labor Party, the 




contained in the assumptive worlds of those in the mainstream of contemporary 
republicans is wrong, I am contending that stronger republican thinking 
is needed. Rather than an ossified republican policy community, we need a 
strongly republican approach to constitutional reform—an approach that was 
sadly absent in the 1990s.
In Australia, the republican policy community was to a significant extent the 
initiative of the Prime Minister of the day, Paul Keating. He took advantage of 
the then recent creation of the ARM to attempt to build a policy community 
around it, led by the then leader of the ARM, Malcolm Turnbull, whom he 
appointed to chair an advisory committee on how to proceed towards the 
republic. Turnbull was quite open about his lack of interest in comparative 
and philosophical issues: ‘a gram of Australian experience is worth…a tonne of 
experience in other countries’ (Turnbull 1993:114). In practice, Turnbull was 
even more blinkered than this, for he did not accord overseas experience even 
a gram of weight in his recommendations. And further, he did not really accord 
any more weight to sub-national experiences in Australia itself.
Right from the start, the fundamental problem was that the issues raised by the 
transition to a republic were of themselves of interest to only a small minority. 
Unless these issues could be tied into issues of greater public resonance, 
opponents of change could cast the proponents as elitists. As things turned out, 
this monarchist tactic was quite effective.
While any constitutional reformer must always be alive to political pragmatics, 
the approach adopted at any one time will be very much a product of the 
governance climate of that time. And here Turnbull was out of luck, for the 
leader who gave the republican cause such momentum was Keating, and his 
approach to political pragmatics was not appropriate for the republican project. 
Keating and his coterie gained an unenviable reputation for arrogant, top-down 
styles of policymaking. Consider this characterisation of the style from one of 
Keating’s insiders (with not a hint of embarrassment about its hubris):
Working Nation created the desire to do more. If it was possible to 
conceive of the means to case-manage tens of thousands of young 
unemployed, it was possible to case-manage regions and communities. 
If it was possible to re-imagine the way governments dealt with 
unemployment, it was possible to re-imagine the way they dealt with 
Aboriginal health. If the government could take on the challenge of the 
revolution in business and industry, it could take on the revolution in 
technology. If it could do these things, surely it might raise the level of 
knowledge and interest in the democracy itself—in its institutions, the 
ideas from which they derived, in the nation’s history. We could move 
on to civics and education generally. (Watson 2002:491)
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Turnbull and his insiders apparently did not find this style all that inimical, for 
they too believed they had the answers before they ventured into the public 
domain. Here is the account of the Republic Advisory Committee’s public 
consultations in Perth from John Hirst, a noted historian, ARM leader and 
member of the committee:
All round the country professors of politics are indignant. The republican 
movement has taken off without waiting to listen to their lectures on the 
true nature of republicanism…
One professor, after finishing his polished address, was about to resume 
his seat when [chairman] Turnbull, switching into lawyer mode, said: 
‘One moment, please professor. Would you return to the witness box 
for cross-examination?’ In twenty seconds Turnbull had him making 
concessions and retractions which undid the force of his paper. (Hirst 
1994:28)
The accuracy of this account has been challenged by one of the politics professors 
present at the hearing in question (O’Brien 1995:56). What is of primary 
relevance here, however, is not the accuracy of Hirst’s account, but rather its 
extraordinary endorsement of the inappropriate behaviour of his chairman. It 
is not the job of the chairman of a public inquiry to harass witnesses and it 
was an abuse of Turnbull’s position for him to have done so. The most likely 
explanation for Turnbull’s behaviour—and for Hirst’s uncritical endorsement 
of it—is that the ARM leaders had already decided, in ‘group-think’ fashion, 
what they were going to recommend, so public hearings were a waste of time. 
This of course turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, for the hearings were 
a failure—one that greatly weakened the republican cause. In the public mind, 
this cause came to be perceived as another exercise in haughty Keating elitism.
From this extremely top-down perspective on policymaking, all that was 
needed to solve any problem was the getting together of a small number of the 
Keating cognoscenti, for they believed that they had between them discovered 
the magic technique of successful policy development. It turned out, however, 
that the one thing they had not discovered was a way of avoiding a landslide 
defeat in the next election. As long as the Keating government remained in 
office, however, it seemed that insiders such as Hirst could be brought to depart 
from their normal academic disciplines if they believed that they had come up 
with simple solutions to complex problems. And their shared belief could be 
summed up in one word: minimalism.
The most serious of the several assumptions of the Australian republican policy 
community has been that which denies a significant continuing political role 
for the head of state. Because of this denial, the policy community has found 
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it convenient to develop a minimalist strategy. If the Australian public could 
be persuaded that the constitutional changes proposed were only minor ones, 
it seemed to believe, perhaps it would be possible to sneak a referendum 
affirmation through, ‘on the quiet’, as it were.
The fatal flaw in this strategy became apparent in the referendum campaign. 
The monarchists found common ground with some of the leaders of the direct-
electionist republicans;4 both saw much more substance in the head-of-state role 
than did the minimalists. Unless the positive contributions that monarchs have 
made to the quality of Australian governance are acknowledged and learned 
from, a way out of this impasse will not be found5.
Good as the Australian system of government has been, it has—in keeping with 
all the other national regimes around the world—been less sure as it has sought 
to handle the emerging system of governance. While government lies and should 
lie at the core of governance in any nation, the emerging system must also attend 
to non-governmental institutions that have come to prominence in an age of 
privatisation and outsourcing. Australia confronts a historic opportunity as 
we move into the new millennium. Just as our colonies took many leads in 
democratisation in the nineteenth century, the transition to a republic could 
lead Australia to an important reorientation of political activity, to make it 
more suited to many of the tasks now beginning to press insistently on national 
governments around the globe.
c) Beyond minimalism
It will be the central proposition of this monograph that the State and its head 
must be accorded a leadership role in the pursuit of truly republican governance, 
but this proposition can be developed only in a broad systemic context. We need 
to fashion a comprehensive and internally coherent framework of republican 
governance—one that recognises the strengths, and remedies the weaknesses, of 
our current arrangements. By establishing this broad context, we can examine 
the ways in which any reforms that might be proposed to deal with weaknesses 
in one element might unintentionally affect other elements, and go on to propose 
ways in which undesirable effects might be avoided.6
4 No wonder some of the direct electionists found common cause with the monarchists, for they were 
scorned by the leaders of the republican policy community. They reminded Malcolm Turnbull (1999:2) ‘of 
Reformation fanatics burning heretics at the stake to save their souls’.
5 In making this assertion, I subscribe to a long-forgotten Australian tradition, recently recovered by 
Cochrane (2006: 535 n.301), in his characterisation of John Dunmore Lang as a ‘loyal republican’, who only 
came to adopt a republican stance when monarchical arrangements had proved lacking.
6 Beer (1973:76 ff.) has proposed a term—‘engrenage’—to cover a familiar phenomenon: the ways in which 
government attempts to deal with problems themselves lead to new problems.
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We are entering an age in which many of the established boundaries—between, 
say, law and convention or between the public and the private sectors—are 
becoming blurred. Democratic government is an essential part of any approach 
to this blurring phenomenon, but it cannot do it all itself. A new form of 
politics—to exist alongside partisan politics—needs to be formally recognised 
and needs to work through a new form of institution, one that reconciles the 
demands of democracy with those of fiducial republican governance. I shall be 
arguing that this new form of institution will be councils of state, sitting at the 
head of equally new monitory branches.
Although I voted in favour of the republican proposal put to the Australian 
people a decade ago, I am now glad that the proposal was defeated. Too much of 
the work needed on constitutional reform remained—and still remains!—to be 
done. Why has this necessary work remained undone?
In the 1990s, the work was not done because of the imminence of the new 
millennium. It was felt by those leading the republican charge—most notably, 
Keating and Turnbull—that there was no time to waste if the window of 
opportunity that they believed to be presented by the centenary of federation 
were to be used. Although they therefore favoured a minimalist approach, 
so that all considerations except those suggested by commonsense as being 
relevant to the abolition of the monarchy were set aside, the intensity of their 
campaign had a ‘crowding out’ effect. No other constitutional reform proposals 
have come to centre stage during or since the republican campaign, which has 
made the past two decades the most bereft of deliberations on such matters in 
the entire history of the Australian nation. Why has this emptiness continued 
over the past decade, since the defeat of the republican referendum?
Part of the explanation for this sad state of affairs must go to the quality of 
leadership provided by Prime Minister John Howard, who must surely have 
been the political leader least interested in constitutional reform of any that 
Australia has experienced.7 The reasons, however, go deeper than this. The 
minimalism so favoured by Keating and Turnbull in the 1990s has continued 
to blight deliberations on both the republic and wider issues of constitutional 
reform.
Yet, some valuable work was done within the minimalist paradigm, and this 
work can be used to provide relevant launching pads for wider-ranging 
considerations of the nature of the republic that will be needed in the years 
ahead. Only when we come to the end of this long journey will it be time for a 
further referendum on the transition to a fully republican state. This journey 
will be a long one because the minimalist paradigm will not be easy to shift; it is 
7 According to Ahamed and Davis (2009:222), this Howard diffidence about structural reform extended so 
widely that they could claim that ‘public sector reform was not a key policy interest of the Howard years’.
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deeply embedded in the commonsense so close to the hearts of most fashioners 
of public policies in Australia. But shift it will, quite possibly only after another 
defeat—this time of a premature plebiscite proposal8—has demonstrated the 
dead-end nature of the minimalist paradigm.
So lengthy will this period of reorientation have to be that I have now come to 
the realisation that I shall not see a fully republican Australia in my lifetime. 
Somewhat to my surprise, this realisation has served to free me up to begin 
the work of directly confronting the minimalist paradigm—a task that has to 
date confounded me. To know that I need only make a start, and that future 
generations will finally come to benefit from the constitutional reforms (that 
might have to await the demise of the minimalist paradigm), has turned out to 
be liberating.9
Counter-posing this sense of liberation is a realisation that reforms of the 
magnitude that are needed will carry appreciable risks of regime malfunctioning. 
I have attempted to minimise these risks by placing collegial bodies—made up 
of the most experienced governance practitioners—at the centre of the proposed 
new regime. In an important sense they will be performing the tasks that have 
been those discharged by those once dubbed (in more sexist times) ‘founding 
fathers’. Such collegial bodies should be relied on to cope with unexpected but 
sometimes serious problems as they arise.
Writing about the American founding fathers, Davis (1995:27–8) made an 
insightful observation that applies more widely to numerous other constitutional 
enterprises: ‘they had composed a new form of government with no precise, no 
defined, no known principles of action. But at base, experience would have told 
them that as a people conducts its politics, so it gives content to its institutions 
and its principles.’
8 In 2008, the Leader of the Greens, Senator Bob Brown, introduced into the Parliament a bill to require 
the government to hold such a plebiscite at the time of the 2010 general election. Fortunately, this will not 
happen. In June 2009, the Senate Committee on Finance and Public Administration reported that the bill 
should not be supported during the life of the current Parliament. (This was about the only merit of the 
extremely limp report of the committee. Anyone wishing to see a recent example of the aimlessness of current 
republican thinking in Australia could do no better than to examine this superficial report: Parliament of 
Australia 2009a.)
9 In a recent essay reviewing my life’s work, I have come to the sad conclusion that it has had little continuing 
effect on the work of others (Power 2009). Perhaps this suggests an answer to the curiously liberating effect 
that this project has had; in this case, I cannot know in my lifetime whether this essay will be different from 
those that have preceded it, so I can hope that it might ultimately come to exert some influence.
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d) Governance and the State
Both governance and the State are concerned with what Low and Power (1984) 
termed the ‘APRA’: the aggregate of policy-relevant activities. Many of these 
activities—usually the most important of them—are either determined or 
shaped by governments, but several are not. Whether they are so shaped or not, 
all the activities in the APRA that fall within its prescribed geographical area of 
sovereignty are the concern of the modern State. The domain of the nation-state 
is thus much wider than that of the government that is embedded in it.
There is therefore a close correspondence (at least for the purposes of this 
monograph) between national governance, on the one hand, and the concerns 
of modern states and their heads, on the other. Of course, in the current era of 
globalisation, many governance activities are not shaped by the modern State; 
in the memorable term of Rosenau (1992), in many international fields, we now 
have governance without government. Although this condition of affairs should 
concern the democrat, it has generally been considered that it could not be 
remedied in the absence of world government, and the governments of existing 
nation-states would never tolerate such a regime. In an epilogue to a companion 
essay to this monograph, I briefly consider the ways in which national councils 
of state might come together to form a global council of states in a way that 
might not be opposed by the governments of the world.
e) Energising our publics
When Australia finally does make it to a republic, such a change will be worthy 
of the appellation ‘constitutional moment’—probably only the third, after the 
advent of responsible government a century and a half ago and federation a 
half-century later, in the whole history of white settlement of the continent. 
A constitutional moment is one when significant shift occurs in the balance of 
established powers. 
Ackerman, who introduced the term in order to come to gain a handle on the 
achievements of three of the greatest US presidents to date—Thomas Jefferson, 
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt—used it to refer to great accretions 
of presidential power, in the last resort independently of what the formal 
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provisions of the nation’s constitution might have stated (Ackerman 1998:409).10 
Of course, the dramatic contexts of these three ‘moments’—nation building, 
civil war and the Great Depression—provided these skilled politicians with 
openings not normally available to political leaders. How could the advent of a 
republic in Australia ever provide a context even remotely like these?
If we are to attempt an answer to this central question, we must identify a set 
of issues with the potential power to energise the Australian citizenry. This will 
be harder to do than in the two earlier constitutional moments in Australia, 
because the nature of the citizenry has changed so radically. Our culture no 
longer possesses the heavily ‘British’ deferential culture that supported our 
political leaders in their earlier achievements.11 And our party system is now in 
an enervated state, with our party grassroots populated largely by those hoping 
to gain some office through party backing. This sad condition of our parties has 
not, however, inhibited them in the accumulation of ever-greater power. They 
are indeed well described in the epithet ‘hypertrophied’ (that is, overextended).
Some party leaders—for obvious reasons usually those who have retired (most 
notably, the late John Button and Malcolm Fraser)—have protested about 
the directions in which their parties have been heading. The parties will be 
regenerated, however, only when they come to support a broad movement—a 
‘fiducial’ movement—towards the fostering of institutional integrity for our 
major institutions. Of course, this movement will not—initially at least—be one 
that will attract deep popular support. We now have the tools, however—if our 
political leaders so wish—to build the needed momentum.
f) Trust and government
So, what can governments do to promote the cause of fiducial governance? There 
are, after all, persuasive grounds for contending that often it is governments 
themselves that are predators on community-based trust: ‘Over the last five 
thousand years, most people across the world have relied on trust networks 
for these (high-risk) enterprises, and have guarded the responsible networks as 
much as possible from governmental intervention’ (Tilly 2005:43).
10 In Ackerman’s view, these moments have been rare in American history, for ‘a constitutional moment 
need not ripen into a new constitutional solution’ (Ackerman 1998:409). This conception of the ‘constitutional 
moment’ is particularly stimulating when we come to consider the ways in which this insight might be used 
in the design of a future ‘moment’. As I shall argue below, a regime that separated the roles of head of state 
and head of government, and that possessed a collegial body (such as a council of state or a French-style 
constitutional council to be consulted on relations between the two) (Rohr 1995:22–3, 48 ff.), could offer a 
more congenial institutional setting than the American system for the workings of a fiducial republican order.
11 Of course, some of the more optimistic of the republicans have contended that the transition to a republic 
might itself have an energising effect (Uhr 1999:3).
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Australia’s most famous corruption fighter, Tony Fitzgerald, has recently 
provided yet another perspective that illustrates the difficulty of reform. As 
Fitzgerald (2010) observes, political leaders themselves serve as role models, and 
if their behaviour is deficient, a vicious circle ensues: ‘People who consider 
themselves powerless outsiders readily become disillusioned, cynical, apathetic 
and disengaged and lose trust in government, the integrity of its process and 
decisions and even fundamental institutions. Principled leadership is essential 
to preserve our confidence in and support for each other.’
So there should be no doubt as to the extreme difficulty of this task. And the 
best account of this difficulty is that of Tilly (2005). Central to Tilly’s analysis is 
the trust network, which he defines tightly as the formation into which people 
set valued resources that have been placed at risk, typically from the mistakes 
and failures of others. In this way, he hopes to avoid the vagueness that so often 
engulfs discussions of the relationships between trust and democratisation (such 
as the glissandi that he plausibly ascribes to the well-known work of Putnam).
Useful as this analytical category is for Tilly, it ultimately is not as relevant 
as it might have been for the task that has been set for this monograph. Tilly 
adopts as his primary perspective the interests embedded in his trust networks. 
From this perspective, governments are seen as dangerous, because ‘regimes 
and trust networks often depend on the same resources—labor, power, money, 
information, loyalty, and more’ (Tilly 2005:23).
Dangerous as governments might be, Tilly does recognise some instances—
relatively rare ones, in his view—when trust networks can be satisfactorily 
integrated into ‘public politics’. At no point, however, does Tilly recognise the 
potential value of a differing perspective—one that accords primacy to a head 
of state in fostering trust among the citizenry.
It is my contention12 that the decline in the authority and power of monarchical 
heads of state has been an important cause of this loss of state capacity. Therefore, 
I propose that a strategy to invest new resources in a reinvigorated office of head 
of state should be able to recapture some of the public trust that has been lost. 
The opportunity exists for a nation such as Australia, which has been struggling 
to find a way through to a republic, to do so in ways that further the cause of 
fiducial governance.
12 At present, this can be no more than a contention, for the decline of heads of states everywhere preceded 
the advent of public opinion surveys. It is now nearly a century since the collapse of many monarchies during 
and immediately after World War I. Experience in the interwar years—especially the accession of Adolf 
Hitler to the office of German head of state—greatly fostered suspicion of the office. In the past decade or so, 
however, the emergence of semi-presidential regimes has reconfigured some head-of-state roles so as to invest 




1. A framework for constitutional 
reform
a) The contingent nature of this monograph
The basic principle that should underlie any attempt at constitutional reform 
is one that is fundamentally Old Institutionalist in character (Power 2009) and, 
possibly because of this, the need for caution often seems better appreciated by 
the citizenry than by the experts; any change must safeguard those arrangements 
that time has shown to have worked well.1 For the most part, the Australian 
system of government has performed as well as most democracies, so we should 
be especially careful when we consider changing it.
If we are to move towards a new regime, we need to be clear about the distinction 
between the monarchical and the republican styles of governance. The former is 
quite comfortable with the buried and the implicit; the latter is always engaged 
in the Sisyphean tasks of making explicit what can be made so, of always 
holding open to question crucial assumptions whenever they are discovered.2
In this monograph, then, I shall be aiming to demonstrate how the existing 
Australian governance regime could be modified in ways that would be of 
international significance.
To date, progress towards a republic in Australia has been blocked by a deep 
division between the direct electionists and the selectionists. This division 
will continue as long as the two schools of opinion see themselves competing 
for the definition of a single office of head of state and the way that person 
1 Shklar (1987:60) has presented a salutary Montesquieuian caution at this point: ‘tampering with a long-
established system…is always a very dangerous thing to do. For it is only in retrospect that we can recognize 
what the basis of its stability was.’ Sometimes, however, circumstances demand reform; all that those who 
undertake such reform can do is to be as conscious as they can be of the strengths that the old system 
exhibited.
2 This characterisation of the republican style of governance might seem to be at variance with the 
Montesquieuian position, at least as this has been put by Shklar (1987:78–9): ‘Republican constitutions are 
exceptionally fragile because they depend on the customs, habits and attitudes of the citizens.’ A Burkean 
might well ask why this should make such regimes so fragile. The important point to be made in the current 
context is, however, that the English regime that Montesquieu extolled worked well because the monarchy 
delivered the public trust needed. Weaken the monarchy—as has happened in Australia—and more explicit 
attention must be paid to the fashioning of public trust through fiducial arrangements.
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should be selected.3 Progress to the republic will resume when it comes to be 
widely recognised that what the two schools want might be so different as to 
warrant a continuation of the current bicephalous arrangement: a monarch (to 
be replaced by an elected president) and a set of governors (left largely, but far 
from completely, undisturbed).
b) Towards a feasible framework
Somewhat later in this section, it will become apparent that, in preparing 
the theoretical framework for this monograph, I have drawn most from the 
recent works of two scholars: Bruce Ackerman and John Keane. At the outset, 
however, I want to make one observation about these two writers that sets the 
scene for all that is to follow in this section. I have been encouraged by the 
preparedness of both writers to go beyond the Rhodes observation at the head 
of this monograph and propose that new good governance regimes—constrained 
parliamentarianism and monitory democracy—could be acknowledged in ways 
that accommodated the numerous institutional mechanisms (estimated by Keane 
to number close to 100) that now constrain our governments.
Between them, however, Ackerman and Keane did not take me far enough 
in probing some of the machinery of government issues that will need to be 
settled before we can progress to a regime of fiducial governance. Neither of 
them has attended to the emergent roles that heads of state could play in such a 
new regime, so neither of them has gone on to consider the ways in which the 
emergence of such roles could greatly strengthen the reform of constitutional 
monarchies along republican lines.
Now, because the exploration of several of these theoretical concerns will take 
me well into the left field noted by my two readers, it would be likely to turn 
off many of the Australian readers with republican interests. Accordingly, I am 
preparing two works—one theoretical and comparative (Power forthcoming), 
and this one—in which several of the theoretical points made in the first piece 
will be presented as givens in the development of the more practically oriented 
argument of this monograph.4
3 The project that has produced this monograph had its roots in the 1990s, when Australians were confronted 
with the opportunity of moving on from the monarchist regime that had so well served the interests of 
European Australians for a couple of centuries. Our reluctance to take that opportunity, on the terms in which 
it was presented in a referendum, has convinced me that an Australian republic will be worth having only if it 
opens up the prospects for better governance. Determining just how republicanism and good governance are 
best related has for me proven to be a daunting task—and one on which I have only now embarked.
4 In the fullness of time, interested readers will be able to access the theoretical arguments in full in the 
companion essay. If, however, the appearance of this companion essay occurs only some months after the 
appearance of this monograph, a stopgap arrangement will be required. Anyone wishing to obtain a draft 
copy of my theoretical essay—or any of the other unpublished papers of mine listed in the references—can 
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c) Writing about fiducial governance: two 
constituencies
I identify two differing constituencies of readers from whom intelligence will be 
needed if the necessary governance design work is to be satisfactorily progressed. 
This design work will be far beyond the capacity of a single individual and 
will require substantial inputs from knowledgeable constituencies. All that this 
individual will be able to do is to propose some frameworks for the organisation 
of varied forms of intelligence as they come in.
The first constituency—and the one at which a companion essay is being aimed 
(Power forthcoming)—is that of the comparative administrationists, for one of 
my primary concerns is the exploration of some fundamental issues concerned 
with machinery of government matters. In particular, I wish in that essay to 
explore in some depth questions about the ways in which the branches of 
governance have been conceptualised and differentiated.
The second constituency—and the one at which this monograph is aimed—
is that of governance practitioners in a nation-state that impresses me as 
being exceptionally well placed to lead in the introduction of a new fiducial 
governance regime: the Commonwealth of Australia. While the argument in this 
monograph will be informed by several of the findings of the more theoretical 
companion essay, it will not probe as deeply, for many of the working premises 
of the Australian machinery of government will be taken as givens.
In this way, I hope that knowledgeable members of these two constituencies will 
be able to provide us with the intelligence we shall need if we are to progress to 
a fuller appreciation of the nature of fiducial governance regimes in the twenty-
first century. If the interpretative framework I shall be presenting gains some 
acceptance, it could be possible to compose a series of collaborative monographs 
on the reforms of particular regimes and, indeed, of global institutions as well.
I shall be contending that we shall realise the promise of fiducial governance 
only if we explicitly recognise that the leading roles in such governance are 
highly political. The constitutional design task is not politically to neuter our 
heads of state, but rather to consider ways in which these political roles can be 
reconciled with the needs of democratic government.
This will not be an easy design task, for the twentieth century witnessed the 
steady erosion of the traditional head-of-state roles that had earlier protected 
obtain copies from me: <john.power@unimelb.edu.au> In addition, although they have not been listed in 
the references, I have been publishing in The Australian Journal of Public Administration a set of reviews of 
several of the works that are listed in the references: Boyce (June 2009), Head et al. (December 2009), Patmore 
(March 2010), Keane (June 2010) and Kumarasingham (September 2010).
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the integrity of each nation’s major institutions. The vacuum so created has 
produced growing anxiety about the effectiveness of the mechanisms that 
are now in place to counter corruption and protect institutional integrity. So 
strong have these concerns shown themselves to be that there has in recent 
times been increasing support for the recognition of new ‘integrity branches’ of 
government, but to date no-one has proposed that revived heads of state could 
be accorded leadership positions in such branches.
In pre-democratic times, heads of state typically played central roles in 
governance. Because most of these heads of state were monarchs, modern 
democratic theory has universally marginalised them, so that these traditional 
roles have fallen into desuetude.
Accordingly, both presidents and constitutional monarchs have been largely 
ignored in recent discussions about the nature of modern governance. As a 
result, insufficient attention has been paid to some serious issues concerned 
with the maintenance of public responsibility for the quality of our governance. 
Because discussion of possible head-of-state roles has been taboo, no-one has 
yet given serious attention to the overall design of the branch structures of 
governance and the ways in which they could be accommodated in existing 
machineries of government. There is thus a significant gap in our understanding 
of fiducial governance.
Anyone doubting the existence of this serious gap in our understanding of 
governance need go no further than Fukuyama’s seminal work, Trust: The social 
virtues and the creation of prosperity (1995).
The argument that sustains the work is both stimulating and subtle and provides 
us with much of what we need as we go about the task of specifying a meaning 
for fiducial governance. Yet, Fukuyama himself does not use his own materials 
in this way. Although he remarks in passing (on p. 355) that the phenomenon of 
trust is probably more central to the political than to the economic sphere, his 
work—as its subtitle indicates—remains oriented much more to the latter than 
to the former.
As Fukuyama convincingly argues, much of the content of trust cannot be 
legislated, for its existence depends on informal but generally recognised 
rules—what (although Fukuyama himself does not mention it) in constitutional 
studies are termed conventions.
One of the most intriguing of the patterns uncovered by Fukuyama is the 
apparent link between constitutional monarchy and relatively high levels of 
trust. On the measure central to his analysis—the capacity of a nation to foster 
the emergence of a multinational firm—constitutional monarchies (Japan, 
Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands) have loomed large. If Australia is to 
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proceed to a republican regime, great care will be needed if the positive features 
of constitutional monarchies are not to be disrupted. Yet the republican policy 
community in Australia has been strangely unconcerned about this need. If we 
are to progress further down the pathway to a republic, we need to understand 
the reasons for this neglect, so as to be able to transcend it.
d) Regaining the sacred at the centre of 
governance
[T]he sense of the sacred is allowed to erode. Everything in public life 
risks being desacralized: persons, places, pledges, prayers, practices, 
words, sacred writings, religious formulas, symbols, ceremonies.
— Pope Benedict XVI, 2009 Good Friday Address
Republicans have paid insufficient attention to the lessons that can be learned 
from long monarchical experience in governance.5 In particular, no attention 
has been paid in the current age of democratic hegemony to the important 
linkages that should be formed between the office of head of state and the realm 
of the sacred. 
Some years ago, Clifford Geertz (1983) made the pertinent observation that, in all 
traditional regimes, the office of head of state occupied a space that was widely 
believed to be sacred. In the absolutist states of the early modern era in Europe, 
this belief found its most forceful expression in the doctrine of the Divine Right 
of Kings. As long as this doctrine remained unchallenged, government attained 
the highest levels of legitimacy. What could be more legitimating for a regime 
than God’s blessing? 
We are not yet finished with Geertz. He goes on to assert that the sacredness of 
central authority persists in modern regimes: ‘Sovereignty may rest now in states 
or even in the population of states…but the “vast universality” that inheres in 
it remains, whatever has become of the will of kings’ (Geertz 1983:146). With 
the growth of secularism and the decline of monarchical institutions, this level 
of legitimacy is no longer available. We shall have to make do with a different, 
5 One of Australia’s leading historians, Alan Atkinson (1993:122), has convincingly shown how the 
monarchy long ‘symbolised the moral purpose of government’. He seems completely at a loss, however, when 
it comes to a consideration of the ways in which this moral purpose might be recovered when the influence 
of the monarchy declines. The best he can come up with is a weird proposal that the Australian monarchy 
could be ‘reconstituted’, either through the British royals spending more time in Australia or through royal 
acquiescence in the installation of a cousin as the Australian monarch.
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more contingent form of regime legitimation. While most republicans are 
quite happy to accept this trade-off between level and form of legitimacy, two 
implications should be openly recognised. 
First, much of the continuing support for the monarchist cause doubtless stems 
from the respect of its adherents for some awe-inspiring remnants of the old 
sacred space. Second, republicans should appreciate that they are being asked 
to endorse a more contingent form of government legitimacy.
This new form of legitimation could appropriately also be described as fiducial—
resting on a constantly renewed pact between the citizenry and those responsible 
for ensuring the integrity of our major institutions. To date, fiducial activity has 
been seen as being undertaken only spasmodically: at times of regime founding, 
such as the referendum that established the Australian Federation at the 
beginning of the past century. Some theorists, most notably Wolin (1996), have 
contended that only in such rare moments can democracy be said to be fully 
alive. As we shall soon see, however, the prominence accorded by Ackerman 
to serial referenda in his framework of constrained parliamentarianism opens 
up the possibility of widening such opportunities for democratic legitimation. 
In such a manner, the sacred space once occupied by the head of state will be 
replaced with a form of democratic legitimation less robust but more suited to 
the current age.
A proper understanding of the importance of the sacred and of the ways in 
which it could be revived in a modern secular democracy is essential for the 
achievement of a republic worth having. We cannot be confident about the 
trustworthiness of our major institutions without the existence of a ‘sacred’ 
core.6 One useful understanding of the sacred conceptualises it as ‘[h]aving 
symbolic value and thus, like good music, facilitat(ing) the evolution of the 
group’ (Lundy 2002).7
Just what would be the role of the State in facilitating the evolution of the 
national group is a hazardous task best left to authoritative collegial bodies, 
such as the councils of state whose creation I shall be recommending. This 
monograph will thus be concerned, inter alia, to suggest provisional agendas 
for such bodies, together with brief rationales for the inclusion of the agenda 
items proposed. 
6 Keane (2009:16) pertinently observes that there was a close association between democracy and the sacred 
in ancient Athens.
7 Eisler (1995: 21) holds a similar conception, linking it to ‘the power to give, nurture and illuminate life...’
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e) Ubiquity in governance of imputation
I first became aware of the importance of imputation when I came to consider 
the implications for modern governance of Friedrich’s magisterial work Man 
and His Government (1963)—in particular, the conception of authority around 
which much of his argument rested. According to Friedrich, authority is the 
capacity for reasoned elaboration in terms of the values, interests and beliefs 
shared by the authority wielder and those subject to its exercise. The politics of 
governance, however, require an extension of this understanding, for what is of 
the utmost importance is the fact that the authority wielder is not required to 
provide such elaboration in justification of every decision. Authority is the most 
effective form of power in governance precisely because its exercise is usually 
not questioned, which allows the public authority wielder to get on with the 
work of governing. The capacity for reasoned elaboration is imputed to the 
authority wielder by those subject to that authority.
Thus, imputation is central to my understanding of public authority and 
governance. As with authority, policies are the purposive constructions that 
are imputed by interested publics to the actions and resource commitments 
of those in authority. Of course, those in authority will never be backward 
in advancing their own purposive constructions, but what is of the highest 
political significance is the extent to which interested publics are prepared to 
accept these authoritative constructions. Sometimes they have good grounds 
for doubting the purposive constructions that have been advanced from on 
high. More commonly, interested publics will concede some validity to these 
constructions. Indeed, the authentication of these authoritative constructions is 
a central element in any responsible system of governance.
As authority is the most pervasive basis for public power, its putative nature 
poses a central political problem for republicanism. To have a capacity imputed 
to a public leader is a great benefit to that person, and it is such a benefit that it 
easily slides into a distaste for ever being called on to validate authority through 
the real demonstration of the capacity for the reasoned elaboration that has been 
imputed. This tendency is especially pronounced when the public leader holds 
a position in a state structure, for much of the affairs of state must always be 
transacted in a setting of confidentiality; hence, ‘reasons of state’.
Thus authority all too easily morphs into authoritarianism, when the holder of 
a public office comes to believe that there is no longer any need for the imputed 
capacity to be validated. Fiducial governance must resist this tendency wherever 
it manifests itself, for the bedrock of such governance is genuine authority. It is 
therefore of the highest political significance that the authority wielder should 
be regularly held to account. But how regular is regular?
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Clearly, the frequency and indeed the nature of the interrogation of the authority 
wielder will vary from one setting to another, so we could expect considerable 
variation among the councils of state as they establish their responsibility 
systems. There is much that inevitably is implicit in the exercise and testing 
of authority, and nowhere is this tendency stronger than in the realms of 
confidentiality that are always at the centre of many of the most important 
concerns of a head of state. The republican style of governance requires regular 
critical inspection of claims of confidentiality. These claims will often prove 
justified, but a republican public is always entitled to some form of vouching, 
where a trusted governance leader who has been privy to considerations of 
confidential matters testifies as to their integrity.
f) Constraining executives 
The orthodox Australian position on the accountability of our political 
executives has most recently received clear expression from Rhodes and 
Wanna (2009:129): ‘Networks not only obscure accountability but they pose a 
challenge to executive co-ordination, and require different management skills to 
bureaucracy or contracts. They open a major research agenda.’
Apparently, Rhodes and Wanna did not consider it part of their brief to go 
beyond the identification of research opportunities to consider some of the 
normative issues raised by constraining reforms aimed at making our executives 
more clearly accountable. For the best recent example of such an endeavour, we 
must turn to the British governance practitioner, Geoff Mulgan.
Although he uses terminology differently to the ways in which I am using it, 
Mulgan’s 2006 work, Good and Bad Power, presents an excellent opportunity 
for the further opening up of many of the issues concerned with fiducial 
governance.
For Mulgan, the primary problem for the attainment of good governance 
can be stated simply: the purpose of governments is everywhere to serve the 
interests of their constituents. Possession of the state power needed to realise 
good governance is, however, so valuable a resource that the state apparatus 
will always attract those who wish to use it for the furtherance of their own 
particular interests, often to the detriment of the public interest.
In order to counteract this ever-present danger, Mulgan (2006:319) proposes the 
establishment of a set of ‘aligned’ constraints (which he terms ‘devices that force 
governments to live up to their roles as servants’):
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• contestability through election
• divisions of power
• the rule of law
• visibility, free media and free access to information.
All four of these constraints need to be properly ‘aligned’ if they are to enhance 
the trust that the citizenry has in the integrity of the institutions that govern 
them. In other words, this alignment is necessary for the attainment of fiducial 
governance. Mulgan, however, does not go far beyond identifying the necessity 
for such alignment; he does not identify an institutional mechanism that could 
take the lead in developing such a mechanism. (One infers that the responsibility 
for this alignment will in Mulgan’s view remain the responsibility of the very 
interests that seek to profit from inside access to state powers. Quis custodiet 
ipsos custodes?)
One reason for Mulgan’s inability to go further stems from his failure to 
distinguish the State from government. Once such a distinction is made, it 
becomes possible to distinguish the fiducial governance roles of heads of state 
from the executive roles of heads of governments. It is the former that is best 
equipped to lead in the discharge of this governance function, if only because 
s/he is usually better placed to secure the trust of the citizenry. The strong 
support of heads of government will be necessary for the establishment of a 
viable mechanism to work on these fiducial tasks, but the head of government 
must in day-to-day political life always be most sensitive to the needs of his/her 
party and the interests that have clustered around it.
Because Mulgan has avoided the formalism that inevitably accompanies efforts 
to draft proposals for constitutional reform, he has been able to explore very 
perceptively the interrelations that should exist between governments and their 
citizenry. His is therefore an outstanding contribution to what an earlier work 
described as ‘societal constitutionalism’ (Sciulli 1992). As this monograph is 
ultimately about constitutional reform, however, we must bite the bullet and 
attempt to render the subtle Mulgan argument in more formalistic terms. It is 
at this point that the work of the comparatist Ackerman is of the greatest use. 
Constrained.parliamentarianism
In the way that Ackerman has developed the framework, constrained 
parliamentarianism offers the prospect of maintaining a measure of coherence as 
we struggle to comprehend the bewildering array of institutions now becoming 
enmeshed in processes of governance. We can speak of no more than a prospect 
at this stage because the theory of constrained parliamentarianism, for all 
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its considerable virtues, is itself still underdeveloped.8 If we understand by 
‘constraint’ a limit than can support as it restrains,9 we can assert that the theory 
of constrained parliamentarianism needs itself to be more heavily constrained.
The great virtue of the Ackerman polyarchical framework is that it enables us 
to assess differing institutional arrangements through use of a good governance 
value base, which has three ‘legitimating ideals’: 
The first ideal is democracy. In one way or another, separation may serve 
(or hinder) the project of popular self-government. The second ideal 
is professional competence. Democratic laws remain purely symbolic 
unless courts and bureaucracies can implement them in a relatively 
impartial way. The third ideal is the protection and enhancement of 
fundamental rights. (Ackerman 2000:640)
Ackerman proceeds to discuss the principal constraints on executive power—
on my reading of him, seven—that serve these ideals. The relations between the 
ideals and the constraints are shown in Table 1.1.
Although the bulk of his long paper is devoted to the exploration of these 
relationships and their implications, Ackerman also goes on to consider a 
long-neglected topic: how the creation of new branches of governance could 
enable us to overcome some of the inadequacies of existing sets of institutional 
arrangements.10 As Ackerman (2000:727) puts it: ‘The power of this center11 is 
checked and balanced by a host of special-purpose Branches, each motivated by 
one or more of the three basic concerns of separationist theory.’
8 Like many Americans who have been unduly influenced by the reading of Montesquieu by their founding 
fathers, Ackerman (2000:695, n. 138, where he describes a prime minister as a head of state) is unclear 
about the fundamental distinction between head of state and head of government. It is for this reason that 
I have found it necessary to add an important further element to the Ackerman framework of constrained 
parliamentarianism: a viable role for the head of state.
9 This positive if contingent understanding of constraint is one that is shared by Ackerman (2005:106) 
himself: ‘If we are lucky in our leaders, they will look upon the emergency constitution in a favorable light: 
rather than seeing it as an obstacle, blocking their reach for arbitrary power, they will appreciate how it 
enhances their legitimate authority to act decisively at times of national crisis.’ The sense, if not the term itself, 
seems also to be present in the observation of Patapan (2000:2) that checks can sustain.
10 It is at this point that the virtues of the Ackerman approach are most readily appreciated. In many 
important respects, his value base strongly resembles the ‘liberal democratic’ base proposed by Kukathas et 
al. (1990). Ackerman, however, proceeds from this base to the specification of an extensive reform program, 
whereas Kukathas et al. ultimately have little to propose except a sceptical negativism.
11 Curiously, Ackerman (2000:727) places the Parliament at this ‘centre’: ‘As the centerpeice of my model of 
constrained parliamentarism is a democratically elected house in charge of selecting a government and enacting 
ordinary legislation.’ The centrepiece to be constrained in any parliamentarian system is not, however, the 
legislature, but rather the political executive: ‘A cabinet is a combining committee—a hyphen which joins, a 
buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origins it belongs 
to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other’ (Bagehot 1872:71–2). All political executives are quite 
properly constrained. Even the traditional sovereign supremacy of the British Parliament was in practice 
constrained by numerous practices and conventions, and in recent years many of these have become expressed 
explicitly in legal instruments, some of them not readily negated by Westminster itself (to the point that one 
distinguished British scholar has been brought to ask whether his nation still has a constitution [King 2001]).
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Table 1.1 Ackerman’s values and constraints







































































Central to Ackerman’s approach to structure, then, is his grouping together 
of diverse functions in branches of government. He builds on the familiar 
triad—legislative, executive, judicial—and goes on to identify a fourth, 
bureaucracy, and to recommend a further four: integrity, regulatory, democracy 
and distributive justice. In addition, he has more recently recommended the 
establishment of a decency commission (Ackerman 2005:112 ff.).
If we were to agree that the recognition of a new branch of government is not 
something that should be advanced lightly, we might well respect Addison’s 
warning that there should not be more than four (see Preface, fn 1). If we decided 
to restrict ourselves to one further branch, which should it be? For those with a 
particular commitment to fiducial governance, the claims of a branch concerned 
primarily with institutional integrity are of the highest significance.
Each of the universally recognised three branches is headed by a collegial body 
(cabinet, supreme court, legislative chamber), is led by an identifiable officer 
(head of government, chief justice, speaker) and has a process (as contrasted with 
a goal) orientation. Any new branch should exhibit the same characteristics. But 
what should it be called?
I propose to appropriate a term recently introduced by Keane (2009): ‘monitory.’ 
This serves my purposes better than the Ackerman term that has attracted a 
measure of support in Australia—‘integrity’—because it refers to a process, 
whereas the latter term refers to a goal.12
h) A monitory branch
In his recent important book, Keane (2009) has drawn our attention to the 
systemic significance of the sets of monitory institutions (for example, 
regulatory and anti-corruption commissions, parliamentary committees, 
auditors and ombudsmen, and so on) that have appeared in most jurisdictions 
in recent decades. As he points out, since 1945 modern democracies have 
witnessed the birth of nearly 100 new types of power-scrutinising institutions 
(Keane 2009:690).13 So significant have these become, in Keane’s view, that he 
has advanced the claim—one that has been widely noted—that a new form 
of regime now exists: monitory democracy. The next step—which Keane has 
12 I explore this issue more fully in a paper to the 2010 Public Policy Network Conference: ‘Monitory 
democracy—or a monitory branch of a democratic regime?’.
13 Coming from another direction—public sector employment—Nelson (2008:56 ff.) has recently come to 
a conclusion that supports the argument of Keane, for she claims that the activities of national governments 
have in recent years been becoming increasingly monitory.
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not yet taken—is to explore the ways in which republicanism could further 
the purposes of monitory democracy. And in this enterprise, the work of 
Braithwaite (1998, and especially 2008) is relevant.
Indeed, it is striking that in his work on monitory democracy, Keane (2009) does 
not pay attention to the ways in which Braithwaite (2008) had earlier treated 
much the same phenomenon from the different perspective of ‘regulatory 
capitalism’. Both examine the ways in which republican measures of explicitness 
have proliferated in recent years, with the former focusing on government 
institutions and the latter on those associated with governance. Yet neither one 
is capable of moving on to examine the ways in which these measures might be 
properly coordinated, as they should be in any responsible regime, for neither 
has explored the ways in which head-of-state offices might be developed in 
ways that promote the democratic ideal of polyarchy (which I discuss more fully 
below).
Given the ubiquity of imputation, republican theorising must inevitably be 
trailing behind the adoption of measures that might forward the republican 
cause. For example, Australian monarchists are fond of claiming that we already 
have a ‘crowned republic’, because we possess many regulatory and monitory 
institutions. They do not go on, however, to assess the quality of the republican 
regime that has been gradually emerging, for such an exploration would require 
attention to possible republican changes to our head-of-state offices.
In the following striking passage from Braithwaite (2008:85), such an exploration 
is begun:
[A] republican who values freedom as non-domination (Braithwaite 1997; 
Pettit 1997) cannot want a separation of powers where each branch of 
governance is left alone to misuse power without too much interference 
within its own sphere from the other branches of government. Rather, 
for the complex world of regulatory capitalism, republican freedom 
requires many separations of private and public powers, not just three 
branches of state governance…No single branch of governance is 
allowed to dominate because, as it seeks to dominate another branch, 
that branch’s interdependence with third and fourth branches will 
protect its semi-autonomy.
In this passage, Braithwaite shows clearly the close connections between the 
central republican goal of freedom as non-domination and the integrity of 
regulatory and monitory institutions. He does not, however, take the next 
republican step, which is to investigate the ways in which heads of state might 
effect polyarchical coordination—that is, the shaping of mutual influences 
towards purposefulness that falls well short of attempted domination. There are 
Fiducial.Governance
26
two dimensions to the achievement of such coordination. First, as Braithwaite 
recognises, recognition of the need for a fresh look at the ways powers are 
separated in existing machineries of governance—and here the work of 
Ackerman is of the highest importance. Second, we face the need for a fresh 
look at possible new head-of-state roles. Let us take these two dimensions in 
turn.
The limitations of the language we use often have a significant effect on the 
form and content of political argumentation. For example, we currently lack 
a term in common use to describe the regime most conducive to democratic 
government. A generation ago, the leading modern student of democracy, Dahl 
(1971), introduced the term ‘polyarchy’ to fill this gap, but the term has never 
enjoyed common usage. It deserves to, for reasons I shall now outline.
Because of its pluralist connotations, polyarchy seems appropriate to the purpose 
of describing a regime well suited to the support of democratic government. 
As Dahl (1971:8) put it, ‘polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially 
popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open 
to public contestation’. The constraints that legitimately bind and support 
democratic governments derive from a polyarchical culture. The ‘fit’ between 
regime and form of government is, however, as Dahl himself reminds us, always 
imperfect. So the tasks of republican governance are never finished and heads 
of states should be centrally involved in tackling these tasks.
For the study of comparative politics, I suggest three levels of analysis14 of 
governance, each with its own characteristic suffix
• -archy denotes a governance regime, in which internal and external relations 
are integrated; one whose jurisdictional boundaries are coterminous with 
those of the modern nation-state (‘mon-’, ‘poly-’, ‘olig-’, ‘an-’)
• -cracy15 denotes the ways in which a government handles the ‘external’ relations 
between the rulers and the ruled (‘demo-’, ‘auto-’, ‘aristo-’, ‘cosmo-’16)
14 We should here note the appropriation by economics of another suffix, which would otherwise have been 
of obvious promise for political purposes: ‘-poly’, as in ‘mono-’ and ‘oligo-’.
15 Terms that possess a ‘-cracy’ suffix—‘demo-’, ‘auto-’, ‘aristo-’—all relate to the style and composition 
of governments. If their meaning is stretched so as to attempt to cover the regime supporting a particular 
form of government, as in much ideological rhetoric about democratisation, many assumptions about key 
relationships—such as those between the form of government and the structure of interests in the civil society 
and culture—are made and then have to be covered up. The outcome, as Little (2008) has recently argued, has 
been the promulgation of ‘democratic piety’.
16 This is a term coined a few years ago by Keane (2003:98), who defined it as follows: ‘A conglomeration of 
interlocking and overlapping sub-state, state and suprastate institutions and multi-dimensional processes that 
interact, and have political and social effects, on a global scale.’ While there are some similarities between this 
concept and Keane’s later ‘monitory democracy’, two important differences should be noted. Most obviously, 
the scope of the two differs, with one being focused on the globe and the other on the nation-state. Less 
immediately obvious, perhaps, is the relative importance of government in the two constructs, for it is much 
more influential at the level of the nation-state than at the global.
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• -ism denotes ‘internal’ relations between the branches of governance, 
especially between the Executive and the legislature (‘presidential-’, ‘semi-
presidential-’, ‘parliamentar-’).17
Before proceeding any further, a cautionary note should be struck. Many of the 
terms that are central to the study of comparative politics—such as ‘regime’, 
‘government’ and ‘governance’ itself—are not susceptible to this treatment. The 
use of the schema is therefore limited.
Nevertheless, the suffix schema can with benefit be compared with the earlier 
‘levels’ schema proposed by Kiser and Ostrom (1982). Table 1.2 compares the 
two schemas.
Table 1.2 Two schemas focusing on ‘levels’ compared
Kiser and Ostrom analytical 
level
















In the discussion that follows, I shall, in the next section, which is concerned 
with the dimensions of constrained parliamentarianism, follow this ‘top-down’ 
order, so as to deal first with those elements that relate most strongly to the 
‘-archy’ level, then with those that bear most strongly on the ‘-cracy’ level, and 
finally those concerned with the ‘-isms’. Having done this, I shall move on to a 
consideration of an element largely ignored by Ackerman but one that is central 
to my reform program: viable head-of-state roles. So important is this dimension 
that I devote the whole of Section 3 to a discussion of its role and character.
Finally, in the concluding Section 4, I revisit the dimensions of constrained 
parliamentarianism, but, because of the transformation that could be 
accomplished by the new head-of-state dimension, in reverse, ‘bottom-up’ 
17 Of course, there are several other ‘-isms’ that should here be noted, although they refer primarily to 
ideologies and thus are not directly relevant to the concerns of the current paper: ‘totalitarian-’, ‘fasc-’, ‘naz-
’, ‘commun-’, ‘social-’. The ‘-isms’ with which this monograph is concerned are those that have to do with 
machinery of government issues.
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order. I end with an account of what remains, suitably constrained, the centre 
of any framework of good governance: republican parliamentary democracy. In 
this way, I can most conveniently set the context for a constructively critical if 
brief assessment of the concept of monitory democracy.
i).Republican.parliamentary.governance:.a.lesson.from.
Australia’s.Indigenous.peoples
It will be amply apparent by now that I favour an indirect approach to the 
attainment of republican governance. Indeed, one of my expert readers 
questioned whether I was really committed to the republican cause at all!
My response is a simple one: the minimalist approach favoured by the 
mainstream of the republican movement (led by the ARM but including some 
of our major parties as well) has been, and will continue to be, seriously flawed. 
Some recent thinking among members of our Indigenous community indicates 
a way in which some of these flaws may be remedied.
When compared with other nations with substantial indigenous populations, 
Australia has to date refused to grant its own Indigenous peoples reserved 
representation. This gap could, however, certainly be filled in the constitution of 
each of the proposed councils of state. The recent report Our Future in Our Hands: 
Creating a sustainable national representative body for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples (Australian Human Rights Commission 2009b) provides 
sound guidance—not only on the question of how Indigenous representatives 
might best be located in the proposed new bodies, but on the broader questions 
concerned with the selection of the most appropriate processes that should be 
developed in the establishment of the councils of state themselves.
Unsurprisingly, in the light of the fluctuating fortunes of and ultimate 
frustrations with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC, 
which was abolished with bipartisan agreement in 2005), the leaders of the 
Australian Indigenous community have had to do some original thinking when 
it came to the development of proposals that entailed the insertion of new 
bodies into already crowded machinery of government domains. They therefore 
proposed the fashioning of three ‘chambers’ to stand between the Indigenous 
electorate, on the one hand, and a national representative body, to be called the 
National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, on the other.
This ‘three-chamber’ strategy could easily be adapted to further the cause of 
fiducial governance18
18 As it will be up to each council of state to determine how it might shape its internal structure in the light 
of developments in other relevant jurisdictions, I have identified only the most obvious starting institutions 
for each chamber. 
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• chamber 1: national peak bodies (representatives from the three established 
branches of government19; from the National Congress of Australia’s First 
Peoples)
• chamber 2: sectoral peak bodies (representatives from the Council of 
Australian Governments; from other councils of state)
• chamber 3: local community and individual representatives20 (representatives 
from the interests represented in the Australian Collaboration and from those 
representing interests not specifically covered by the Collaboration (for 
example, women, the aged, the disabled).
19 Although it would be optimal for fiducial governance if each judicial branch were accorded full 
membership in its Council of State, it has to be acknowledged that, as they stand, the constitutions of 
many Australian jurisdictions would not permit this. Accordingly, ‘weaker’ forms of representation (of 
the kind identified in Chapter 4) would be the best hoped for, until the climate of consitutional reform 
improved.
20 The Australian Collaboration was created in 2000, with the following membership: Australian 
Council of Social Service; Australian Conservation Foundation; Australian Consumers Association; 
Australian Council for International Development; Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils of 
Australia; National Council of Churches in Australia; Trust for Young Australians; Representative of 
indigenous population (now the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples).
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2. The current Australian regime
a) Strengths and weaknesses of the current 
regime
The most recent comprehensive assessment of the current Australian regime, 
Australia: The state of democracy, lists no fewer than 50 strengths and 58 
weaknesses, although it does not go on to recommend explicit reform strategies 
for improvement (Sawer et al. 2009). It does, however, supply us with a useful 
checklist for setting a context for the discussion of six of our eight sections 
below.1
Perusal of the more than 100 items of assessment that follow shows that 
Australia: The state of democracy follows a fairly standard left-liberal line, 
being particularly concerned with the effects of anti-terrorism laws and with 
the inequitable treatments still meted out to Indigenous Australians and many 
asylum-seekers. This inclination should be constantly borne in mind as we 
move through the categories of the constrained parliamentarianism framework. 
(As the purpose of Australia: The state of democracy differs from that of this 
monograph, some of the item ‘placements’ will be fairly rough and ready; 
despite this, they perform the service required of them, for they provide a good 
context for evaluation.)
b) Parliamentary democracy













1 Surprisingly, this report concerns itself only in passing with one of the major categories suggested by 
Ackerman: a strong upper house of the Commonwealth Parliament. Unsurprisingly, it, like Ackerman, ignores 





































































































The exhaustive Sawer checklist in Table 2.1—with its 27 ‘strengths’ and 32 
‘weaknesses’—enables us to make a balanced judgment on the current condition 
of Australian parliamentary democracy. The most prominent theme that emerges 
from a reading of these lists is the way in which the formal provisions of a 
constitution that is now more than a century old are still so heavily influential. 
And it has been in those areas that are more difficult to shape through formal 
constitutional provision that weaknesses have become most apparent. So, if 
we are to move towards fiducial governance, we need to compensate for one 
major shift that has occurred during the nation’s existence, although it has been 
ignored by Sawer—the weakening of the influence of the Crown—an influence 
that was all too prominent when the constitution was being drafted. And as we 
move to specify the reforms needed to compensate for this weakening, we can 
learn some important lessons from one set of citizens who were extremely poorly 
recognised in that same drafting process of the 1890s: Indigenous Australians.
As we have already noted above (in Section 1k), the recent report Our Future in 
Our Hands provides sound guidance not only on the question of how Indigenous 
representatives might best be located in the proposed new bodies, but on 
the broader questions concerned with the selection of the most appropriate 
processes that should be established in the development of the councils of state 
themselves.
c) Federal structure2

















The most recent review of the condition of Australian federalism (Fenna 
2009:155) concluded that there was little compelling reason to support the 
continuation of the system, for there ‘has been the apparent absence of any 
2 It had been my expectation that a recent monograph in this series (Brown and Bellamy 2007) would 
provide much that could be valuable for this project.  Brown is after all a first–class scholar, and one who 
had played a leading role in the earlier NISA project (Griffith University 2005) that had paid considerable 
attention to the importance of institutional integrity for governance regimes in Australia.  I was, however, to 
be disappointed, for Brown ignored the NISA report in the later work.
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sociological basis for divided jurisdiction in this country’. It could be, however, 
that there are other reasons—such as improvement in the quality of governance 
through a regime of serial referenda—that could still be persuasive. The best of 
the students of modern Australian federalism, Brian Galligan, has attempted to 
show how strong popular involvement has imparted republican legitimacy to 
the system.
Although the most important recent work on Australian federalism has thus 
been Galligan’s A Federal Republic (1995), this work would have been even 
better if it had dealt more fully with head-of-state roles. Galligan searchingly 
uncovered and criticised a number of the premises that had long dominated 
thinking about the Australian constitutional system. His great accomplishment 
is to demonstrate that all the various proponents of responsible government 
have paid insufficient attention to the considerable constraints that have been 
placed on all our governments and their constituent branches by our federal 
constitutional framework. These constraints are, in Galligan’s (1995:14) view, 
appropriate and legitimate, because federation entailed a ‘transformative act 
of the Australian people’. In this respect, he is aligning himself with one of 
the two traditions that have dominated Australia’s ‘dual constitutional culture’: 
the federal (which Galligan favours) and parliamentary responsible government 
(Galligan 1995:50).
Galligan’s (1995:14) central proposition is that Australia already possesses a 
republic, ‘because the constitutions, for both the Commonwealth and the States, 
are the instruments of the Australian people who have supreme authority’. The 
people are claimed to have exercised this authority because they democratically 
approved the constitution at the end of the nineteenth century and since then 
have had to approve in referenda any further formal changes. This regime is 
a ‘crowned republic’ because the Australian people considered the monarchy 
appropriate to the needs of the federating nation (Galligan 1995:18).
There are, however, serious problems with this argument. Galligan’s rather too-
ready acceptance of the monarchist slogan that Australia is already a crowned 
republic passes over the very considerable tensions that exist between the 
monarchical and republican styles of governance. 
The fact that our forebears considered the Crown to be a central feature of the 
legitimation of the new constitution has led to the continuation to the present 
day of much of the ‘good chaps’ culture of governance, especially but not only 
in gubernatorial offices. And sometimes the ‘good chaps’ have not been up to 
the task of policy development in a federal system. As Sawer and her colleagues 
(2009:295) have recently observed, ‘The system creates subnational “veto 
points” that can obstruct policy which a national government has been elected 
to enact and hence frustrates “the will of the people”.’
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This leads us to a second problem and that is whether the contemporary 
citizenry will be satisfied that it has participated sufficiently in the shaping of 
our constitutional framework for it to be accorded full democratic legitimacy.
Unlike Galligan, who has been quite content to contend that the necessary 
constitutional legitimation was achieved in Australia in the one founding 
moment more than a century ago,3 Ackerman (2007:1800) explicitly considers 
the implications of long lapses in time: ‘It is one thing for South Africans or 
Germans to follow a constitution handed down a decade, or a half-century, ago; 
quite another for Americans to cling to an antique text that fails to mark any of 
the nation’s recent achievements.’
Galligan is thus insufficiently critical in his assessment of the Australian 
constitutional arrangements. He is so intent on demonstrating that much of the 
needed reforms of our governance can be achieved through ‘subconstitutional 
institutions’ (Galligan 1995:37) that he is insufficiently sensitive to some of the 
tensions that underlie our system. 
How well does the Australian regime handle these tensions, which are inescapable 
in any republic? In other words, how good is our republic? This is a question 
Galligan does not directly address. Instead, he contents himself with several 
iterations of a populist point: that the people usually have more sense than 
the ‘expert’ elites who frequently distrust them. Because the Turnbull report 
was based on ‘an interpretive tradition of arid legalism’ (Galligan 1995:25), it 
lacked the faith in the good judgment of the Australian people that ultimately 
led Galligan (1999) to support direct election of the head of state. 
It is, however, surely possible to develop the Galligan argument further. He 
(1995:135) has himself noted the ‘patchwork of human rights measures’ that 
has emerged in recent years. He has also stressed the need for a strengthening of 
the consensual elements in our public life (Galligan 1995:132, 213). These two 
themes have subsequently been linked in the 2005 NISA report, which called 
for recognition of a separate governance review council. Neither Galligan nor 
NISA has, however, given consideration to the ways in which those playing 
roles in head-of-state offices might be able to take the lead in the development of 
such bodies, which could substantially strengthen the consensual dimensions 
of public life.
3 It should be acknowledged, however, that even long-distant public affirmations could be of fiducial 
significance. As Zines (2008:557) puts it: ‘The concept of sovereignty of the people, therefore, must be regarded 
as either purely symbolic or theoretical. Seen as a symbol it might be regarded as similar to the symbol of 
the Crown, uniting the various organs and elements of the organisation of government under one concept.’
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d) Strong upper house 
Bicameralism does not sit easily with Westminster regimes. As the Abbe Sieyes 
observed long ago, if the governing party controls the upper house, much of 
what that house does is superfluous. If, on the other hand, the government 
of the day does not control the upper house, much of what it does will be 
obstructive (Uhr 2008:13).4 Upper houses retain their attractiveness, however, 
for the more consensually minded democrats, for in most jurisdictions they have 
shown greater readiness than their lower house colleagues to become involved 
in policy development through committee activity (Halligan et al. 2007).
In modern democratic times, the balance of power has shifted towards lower 
houses in most bicameral regimes. In the Australian states, for example, most 
upper houses have lost much of their blocking powers. Contemporary theorising 
has also followed this trend; thus Ackerman’s framework of constrained 
parliamentarianism envisages an upper house with only ‘half’ powers.
Although Ackerman (2000:671 ff.) gives some consideration to federalism as one 
of the constraints in his framework, he does so in a curiously limited way. His 
discussion of federalism is devoted almost totally to the ways in which it can 
shape upper houses at the national level. And in his advocacy of German-style 
‘half-house’ upper houses, he gives insufficient attention to the optimal balance 
that should be struck between the powers of an upper house, on the one hand, 
and its effectiveness, on the other. The Australian experience suggests that a 
‘half-house’ upper house might not be powerful enough to be properly effective 
and that greater powers might therefore be desirable, even though these powers 
might very occasionally be misused. In addition, Ackerman’s focus on the 
relation between federalism and his preferred ‘one and a half’ legislature raises 
a serious problem that he does not consider. Upper houses in federal systems 
are more likely to be in serious political conflict with their lower houses than are 
upper houses in unitary systems (Tsebelis and Money 1997:212).
There have been strong voices expressing a view contrary to that of Ackerman—
that accountability should weigh more heavily than democracy. Consider, for 
example, some of the arguments recently advanced in the revealingly entitled 
volume Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The upper house solution. 
In the opening chapter of the volume, the editors make the important point 
that ‘an institution with its own democratic credentials constitutes a far more 
substantial accountability hurdle than any creation of ordinary statute law’ 
4 A recent innovation in Singapore has shown how the review function so often associated with upper 
houses might in a unicameral regime be discharged by another institution—in the case of Singapore, none 
other than a directly elected presidency (Tan 1997)!
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(Prasser et al. 2008:6). They do not, however, go beyond the Parliament in their 
search for appropriate democratic mechanisms for holding the Executive to 
account. Like all the contributors that follow them, they do not directly address 
the problem caused by rigid party discipline. Instead, they seem to assume that 
the benefits of having an upper house that lacks a government majority will 
always outweigh the costs.
e) Professional public service 
















There is sufficient testimony to the extent of politicisation of our public services 
to justify a searching examination by a council of state. No-one alive is better 
placed than former senior minister and governor-general Bill Hayden to offer a 
judgment here, and he (2008:xii–xiii) considers the process of politicisation to 
be ‘well advanced in the Commonwealth’. 
When they came to consider the ways in which the integrity of the public 
services could best be secured in an age of ‘political management’, Halligan and 
Power unsurprisingly commented favourably on a then recent proposal from the 
Review of Public Service Management in Victoria (which Power had chaired):
The Executive Branch would commit itself to the realization of values of 
equity and efficiency, in their several meanings…
[The review] concluded that the principles of merit and equity [required 
the establishment of] a new statutory body with a focused mission—a 
Commission of Merit and Equity. (Halligan and Power 1992:252)
A decade and a half later, the just retired Australian Public Service Commissioner, 
Andrew Podger (2007), presented a powerful argument that strongly indicated 
that the Hayden view was correct—that power had become too heavily 
concentrated in the hands of the prime minister and the head of his department. 
It was, Podger suggested, time for administrative values to be strengthened and 
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the Halligan/Power work had suggested a most effective way for this to be done: 
through the establishment of a new collegial body such as the Commission for 
Merit and Equity that had been recommended by the Victorian review.
How this commission would best be formed, and how it would relate to other, 
similar corporate bodies that have recently been recommended, such the NISA 
Governance Review Councils, would in each jurisdiction be matters best left to 
the pragmatic judgments of the collegial body that would head up a proposed 
monitory branch: a council of state. 
f) Independent judiciary














In the words of a former Chief Justice of the High Court, the court has ‘an 
uneasy and ill-defined relationship with the other arms of government’ (Mason 
in Patapan 2000:viii). The principal reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs 
has been the court’s clear recognition in recent years of the political dimension 
of much of its work. By discarding the ‘apolitical’ mask, the court has of course 
laid itself open to the claims of the underprivileged, as the Sawer et al. list of 
‘weaknesses’ in Table 2.4 shows. 
The now largely discarded ‘apolitical’ view was put by former High Court 
Chief Justice Barwick: ‘the United States Supreme Court was inevitably drawn 
into political issues because it was required to interpret that country’s Bill of 
Rights. Australia had no Bill of Rights, so the Australian High Court had no 
political questions to decide, went Barwick’s extraordinary argument’ (Kercher 
1995:181). The discarding of one orthodoxy has, however, not yet been followed 
by a coherent statement of the nature and boundaries of the form of politics with 
which the judiciary is now grappling. In the absence of such an understanding, 
we find that some attorneys-general are now refusing to play the traditional 
roles of defenders of the judiciary when they face political attack. A council 




g) Securing human rights





































In an address to the National Press Club immediately after the release of the 
report of a National Human Rights Consultation Committee, Frank Brennan took 
the unusual step of distancing himself from one of the key recommendations 
of the committee that he had just been chairing. He was reported as having 
expressed doubts about giving the High Court power to issue declarations of 
incompatibility over legislation, saying this ‘might not be workable’. The public 
is entitled to ask just what has been going on. 
It would seem that the National Human Rights Consultation Report (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2009a) has been fatally flawed by the assumption 
that has been questioned above: that there should only ever be three branches 
of governance. At no point does it question the orthodox division of government 
functions into just three categories: legislative, executive and judicial. As a result, 
it wrestles continually, but ultimately unsuccessfully, with the attainment of one 
of its key objectives: to respect the ‘sovereignty’ of parliament. This objective 
cannot be reconciled with the ‘dialogue’ approach favoured by the committee—
for one very good reason. The Australian Constitution requires the High Court to 
confine its activities to judicial matters, yet any attempt to ‘judicialise’ a charter 
of human rights inevitably leads to a challenge to the sovereignty of parliament. 
The High Court can concern itself with any matter when there are two parties 
in dispute, and in human rights cases one of these parties inevitably has to be a 
government minister, who is also a Member of Parliament.
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So why did the committee favour the ‘dialogue’ model, especially when it agreed 
that there had been precious little dialogue in the neo-Westminster regimes—in 
Britain, Canada, New Zealand, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria—
where it had been introduced? And why did it not give consideration to other 
ways in which dialogue between the leaders of the branches of government 
could be encouraged? The answers to both of these questions can be gained if the 
assumption that there can be only three branches of government is questioned. 
The committee favoured the dialogue model because it was the one that came 
closest to respecting the sovereignty of parliament; whenever the courts found 
that an act was incompatible with the provisions of the Human Rights Charter, 
it would not rule the new act ultra vires, but would simply refer the offending 
act back to a minister for attention. This was close, but not quite close enough. 
If a fourth ‘monitory’ branch of governance—headed up by a council of state 
on which the leaders of the three recognised branches were seated—were to be 
established, an appropriate forum for inter-branch dialogue would be available. 
Importantly, any judges seated on this body could discharge their functions 
without thereby compromising their roles on judicial matters (see Note 4 in 
Section 4 for Zines [2008] on judges appointed as personae designatae). And if 
heads of state were to be involved in the work of these councils of state, another 
important assumption—that the head of state could be safely ignored—would 
be exposed.5
h) Integrity of major institutions 

















The serious ‘weaknesses’ in Table 2.6 have arisen because understandings 
of the three key elements in my argument—trust, institutional integrity and 
governance—have been dealt with in separate disciplinary contexts. The gap 
that I propose to fill with the concept of fiducial governance has come about 
5 It is extraordinary that the Human Rights Commission report, like the NISA report before it, completely 
ignores the office of head of state. 
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because the phenomena concerned have ‘fallen through the cracks’. Not one 
of the best recent treatments—of trust (Braithwaite 1998; Tilly 2005) and of 
institutional integrity (the NISA project [Griffith University 2005] and Head 
et al. 2008)—has satisfactorily come to grips with the political issues that 
inevitably surround major machinery of government design challenges. Let us 
consider these cases in turn.
Braithwaite (1998:370) provides a frustrating conclusion to what is otherwise 
an enlightening essay: ‘Private and public sector ombudsmen and auditors, 
independent arbitrators and judiciaries, professional societies, a free press, and 
international institutions can all be important to nuanced institutionalization 
of distrust.’ 
But just how might this importance manifest itself? Braithwaite does not provide 
a clear answer to this question. In part because he does not even consider the 
Braithwaite essay, Tilly has even less to say about such institutional matters.
The starting point for any discussion under this heading must be the important 
NISA report, which has called for each Australian jurisdiction to create a ‘non-
partisan’ governance review council to coordinate the activities of the several 
bodies now concerned with issues of institutional integrity. It has also stressed 
the need for these councils to gain ‘institutional champions’ (Griffith University 
Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law and Transparency International 
2005:61); and it is hard to see how political leaders could not be prominent 
among these champions. NISA does not, however, show how these champions—
some of whom are necessarily party leaders—could properly relate to the new 
councils. Indeed, the NISA report pays no attention to possible ways in which 
those playing head-of-state roles could become involved—an omission that 
would have been inconceivable in a report written a single generation ago, 
when ‘the Crown’ still loomed large in the protection of the integrity of our 
major institutions.6
The NISA (2005:68) report does amply justify its major conclusion that ‘the 
Commonwealth should take the opportunity of a new institutional reform to 
inject a significant amount into its core institutional capacity’ to assure integrity. 
Accordingly, its first two recommendations are that the Commonwealth should 
establish an integrity and anti-corruption commission and a governance review 
council, with memberships for the most part made up of the leaders of those 
institutions the report had earlier identified as ‘core’: ombudsman, auditors-
6 This is another assumption—that the head of state no longer has any relevance to the fostering 
of institutional integrity—that is hampering reform. Possibly because republicans are nervous about 
strengthening a head-of-state role that has traditionally been associated with the monarchy, they have ignored 
the possibility that a republican leader could play a significant role in integrity assurance. I have made this 
point in communications with the NISA secretariat and with academics associated with the NISA project, but 
have received no response.
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general, and so on. Are these, however, sufficiently ‘heavy’ to provide the needed 
leadership, given that the report bemoans the ‘lack of effective institutional 
champions’ (p. 61) and raises the crucial question: ‘Do senior political and 
business officeholders possess…the will to provide genuine leadership in 
integrity matters’ (p. 62). This is the crucial question, for, as the report goes on 
to argue, 
for…the most fundamental dimension of the integrity system to work, 
there must also be mechanisms to ensure that appropriate parliamentary 
and executive standards are set and maintained, and that alleged integrity 
breaches can be investigated and publicly reported upon, even when it 
might be in the perceived self- interest of all political parties to let the 
truth languish. (Griffith University Institute for Ethics, Governance and 
Law and Transparency International 2005:85) 
The report has, however, earlier stated that it ‘did not reach definitive 
conclusions on how integrity system capacity should be developed in relation 
to political parties’ (p. 77). It is not surprising, then, that the report considered 
overall progress at the Commonwealth level had been unacceptably slow and 
halting. It would seem that the politics of constitutional reform needs further 
consideration. Where might genuine political champions be found at the 
Commonwealth level?
The obvious place to start a search for such champions is the list of institutions 
provided by the report’s ‘mapping’ exercise. And here we encounter a most 
surprising omission, for again there is no acknowledgment of the integrity role 
that is being played, or could be played, by the head of state. Inevitably, then, 
there is no consideration of the ways in which integrity assurance could be 
strengthened by the move to a republic (although there is a passing reference 
to Braithwaite’s ‘republican conception of guardianship’; p. 16). Both former 
Governor-General Paul Hasluck, who introduced important innovations in this 
area, and former Victorian Governor Richard McGarvie, who emerged a few 
years ago as the latest champion of the Hasluck approach, are ignored.
This lacuna is in itself testimony to the desiccated state in which the Australian 
monarchy now finds itself; even a single generation ago, it is inconceivable that a 
wide-ranging review of public integrity would have dared to omit any reference 
to the significance of ‘the Crown’.
What is needed is a high-level collegial body with a membership similar to 
that of the Irish Council of State (which is discussed briefly below). The early 
recommendations of the NISA report could easily be reconciled with such an 
initiative. For example, the council of state could be requested to consider 
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adapting the proposed integrity and anti-corruption commission so that it could 
serve as the council’s secretariat. And the proposed governance review council 
could be constituted as a committee of the council of state. 
The NISA project at least touched on the ways in which these several activities 
might be coordinated, with its recommendation that each Australian jurisdiction 
should establish a governance review council to discharge that purpose, but it 
failed to go on to examine the political issues raised by such a major restructuring 
of the machinery of government.
i) Serial referenda
The Australian Constitution has proven extremely difficult to change, with only 
eight proposals (of 44) being approved in referenda during more than a century. 
And it is now more than a decade since any referendum was put to the people. 
Australia is thus far away from Ackerman’s preferred state—where the citizenry 
would regularly be accorded the opportunity to vote on major issues.
Few commentators have considered the possibility that it has been the party 
system that has been responsible for many of the negative votes. While it 
has been widely recognised that bipartisan agreement has been a necessary 
prerequisite for success, few have pondered the implications of the observation 
of one recent prime minister (John Howard) that often even the securing of such 
agreement might be counterproductive, in that the citizenry might have well-
founded suspicions that anything that the major parties agreed on might well 
serve their shared interests, which might well not be the public interest.
Clearly, any reforms that improved the fiducial standing of the party system 
could improve the chances of referendum success, as would regular referendum 
experience for the citizenry. More generally, I shall be arguing below that 
much valuable work can be accomplished by the several councils of state and 
their committees before they embark on the tasks of securing popular approval 
through serial referenda.
j) Viable role for the head of state7
In his persuasive analysis of the governor’s role in Australia, former Victorian 
Governor Richard McGarvie (1999) placed great stress on the constitutional 
7 Throughout this monograph, I have not sought to differentiate the gubernatorial roles in the Commonwealth 
and state/territory jurisdictions, although I recognise that the specifics of these roles will require the careful 
attention of each council of state.
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counselling function. Because governors are in effect chosen by prime ministers 
and premiers, they are sufficiently trusted to be accepted as providers of 
continuing confidential counsel to ministers requiring royal assent to their 
respective pieces of legislation. McGarvie drew two important lessons from his 
analysis: the governor-general has to be trusted by the government of the day 
and therefore should continue to be selected by it; and the governor-general 
should continue to have substantial formal executive powers, so that ministers 
have to come to him or her with requests for formal assent. Ex-ministers to 
whom I have spoken have confirmed the value to them of this counsel. 
In addition, McGarvie subtly explores the relationship between Australian heads 
of government and their governors. He demonstrates that this relationship—
one of increasing importance in securing stability of governance throughout our 
nation’s first century—is based solidly on conventions backed by sanctions. The 
chief minister and his/her governor are locked together in a structure of mutual 
deterrence. Each may, at considerable cost, secure the dismissal of the other but, 
knowing this, each of them customarily desists. This is a most important ‘buffer’ 
protecting both the chief minister and the pair sharing the responsibilities of 
the head of state.
More recently, Boyce (2008) has furthered what I might call the ‘Hasluck/
McGarvie project’ through the identification of four central themes
• the need for the role of the modern head of state to be given more serious 
attention than it has to date enjoyed in debates about the desirability of a 
republic
• the extent to which the conventions that constrain the immense formal 
gubernatorial powers might be codified (at least in part)
• the ways in which educational and other programs might heighten public 
awareness of the gubernatorial roles currently being played
• identification of the most appropriate mechanisms for the determination of 
continuing reforms and rationalisations (which would not necessarily lead to 
republican regimes). 
To start with, Boyce favours a working party of governors’ secretaries consulting 
closely with officials of chief ministers’ departments and reporting to both a 
governors’ conference and concerned cabinets.
Although these themes of Boyce’s are valuable ones, he is on the whole fairly 
cautious in the reforms he advocates. So, when he turns to the exploration of 
his four themes and their implications, the limitations of his approach become 
manifest. Because he sticks so closely to current practices and orthodoxies, 
Boyce seldom allows himself the freedom to discuss reform proposals that go 
beyond such orthodoxies. For example, he accords little attention to experiences 
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in those regimes—the semi-presidential—that have been growing greatly in 
numbers around the globe in recent decades and that can offer many important 
lessons for constitutional reformers in Westminster systems.
This limitation of Boyce’s approach is most evident in ‘Republicanism’, the 
penultimate chapter of his book. Despite its title, The Queen’s Other Realms 
gives authoritative support to mainstream Australian republican thinking. That 
mainstream has steadfastly clung to the merger assumption: that because the 
office of the head of state should be kept within minimalist bounds, its function 
should be discharged by a single officeholder, who would replace the current 
bicephalous arrangement. Although Boyce notes a serious tension between 
the ‘twin roles’ of constitutional guardian and symbol of national identity, he 
does not go on to consider the possibility that these roles should be performed 
by separate officeholders. In this respect, as in most others, he is firmly in the 
mainstream. Accordingly, he offers no criticism of the current strategy of the 
ARM, which is to force the electorate to choose between a number of ‘models’, all 
of them seriously flawed, in part because they all rest on the merger assumption.
One of the most important of Boyce’s observations is his demonstration of the 
ways in which the traditional royal prerogative has in modern Westminster 
regimes been appropriated by political executives, to their very great 
empowerment. While he goes on to consider the ways in which residual head-
of-state entitlements have allowed some sovereigns and their surrogates to 
play the limited Bagehotian roles of being consulted, and proffering warning 
and encouragement, he does not give as satisfactory an account as McGarvie 
previously did in his Democracy of the political economy of relations between 
heads of state and heads of government in Westminster regimes, and of the place 
of conventions in those political economies.
One pattern that has become increasingly apparent only in the months that 
have elapsed since the appearance of Boyce’s book is that Australian Labor 
prime ministers are now selecting activist governors-general. Commenting 
on one of these, Sir William Deane, Boyce observes that his high profile ‘is 
unlikely to be repeated’—a prediction that now is being challenged by the new 
Australian Governor-General, Quentin Bryce. We still lack a coherent account 
of the ways in which a modern governor might proceed. Some guidance can be 
obtained, however, from a perusal of Australia’s leading student of the ethics of 
governance: John Uhr.
Uhr has extensively discussed republican writings in much of his work and 
has been closely associated with the NISA project, but has ignored the head 
of state in his most recent book, Terms of Trust (2005). Some valuable lessons 




Uhr and I share commitments to parliamentary democracy, institutional 
integrity and republicanism. We differ in the degree of contingency that we 
are prepared to accept in the formulation of our respective reform strategies. 
Uhr does not question the central features of the power structures of Australian 
governance, such as the rigid disciplines of the parties or the orthodoxy of the 
three-branch division of powers. Instead, he is content to advance a number of 
modest but worthwhile reforms that make existing structures of dominance more 
accountable, without ultimately questioning their rationales (see, for example, 
the dozen recommendations with which he concludes his important 1998 work 
on deliberative democracy). As he observed later, ‘policymaking is all about 
compromise’ (Uhr 2005:39). At no point does he move on to a discussion of the 
topics that are at the centre of my reform proposals: the need for a collegial body 
to head up a monitory branch, in pursuit of many of the goals that Uhr covers 
under the rubric ‘terms of trust’. 
It will have become all too apparent by now that I favour the strengthening of 
positions that have long been underused—those relating to head-of-state offices. 
It is at this point, however, that I must attempt to resolve an issue that might 
seriously disturb the coherence of my argument. Long before I became interested 
in the problems arising from the threats to the integrity of the major institutions 
of governance and the need to proceed gradually on constitutional reform if 
we were to counter these threats, I belonged to the ‘republic now’ camp. And 
while I belonged in that camp, I had propounded a strategy for the immediate 
strengthening of head-of-state offices. While much of this strategy has had to 
be revised to make it consistent with my more recent indirect approach, a good 
deal of it remains in place. Therefore, I have decided to devote the next section 
of this monograph to an ‘unpicking’ of this strategy, before returning in the 
concluding section to a consideration of the ways in which the implementation 
of such a strategy could assist in the tackling of the major problems confronting 
advocates of fiducial governance.
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3. Reconfiguring head-of-state offices 
in Australia
In this section, I advance eight propositions about the reform of gubernatorial 
offices in Australia. Taken together, these propositions constitute an ambitious, 
ultimately republican reform program. While there is a logical progression from 
one proposition to the next, the degree of political difficulty increases as we 
progress. So the extent to which the program can be implemented will vary from 
one jurisdiction to the next. Even if only the first proposition is accepted in a 
single jurisdiction, that would in itself represent a considerable initial reform. 
It would not, however, in itself guarantee a regime of fiducial governance. 
So, in the concluding section, I shall be taking as given the realisation of all 
eight propositions. In this way, I hope to demonstrate the ways in which the 
achievement of a fully republican regime could contribute to the remedying of 
the several regime defects identified in the preceding section.
a) Accountability of governors
Each governor should be more accountable than at present for what s/he does. 
Current arrangements continue to be excessively monarchical, in that governors 
are expected to regulate their own behaviour in accordance with the norms of 
what Peter Hennessy (1995) has dubbed the ‘good chaps’ culture characteristic of 
monarchical regimes.1 Under the current arrangements, as long as the governor 
can keep happy the head of government (who is after all usually responsible for 
1 Hennessy (1995) has pointed out that this culture is normally secretive. To the extent that we know 
anything about this culture, it comes from ‘insiders’ discussing what they have been cleared (or, as good 
chaps, have cleared themselves) to divulge. According to Hennessy (1995:56–7), at the core of the British 
arrangements is a ‘golden triangle’ of good chaps, consisting of the Queen’s and the Prime Minister’s Private 
Secretaries and the Cabinet Secretary. This triangle is not formally accountable to anyone else for much of 
what they do together, although they no doubt consult closely with their principals. They provide the best 
example, however, of the ‘good chaps’ culture especially typical of the monarchist regime. On the assumption 
that only good chaps make it to these high positions and are loyal to the service of ‘the Crown’, nothing more 
in the way of accountability is deemed to be required. And in Australia, the leading good chaps have been the 
governors themselves, as they have been chosen by their heads of government on criteria that are never made 
public. The activities of the ‘good chaps’ are of course regulated by conventions: ‘the general agreements of 
public men about the “rules of the game” to be borne in mind in the conduct of public affairs’ (Hennessy 
1995:36–7). There is, however, usually a large measure of uncertainty about the current bindingness of any 
specific convention. Hennessy reports having been persuaded that any putative convention that could be 
abandoned by an incoming prime minister is not worthy of classification as a convention, no matter how many 
previous prime ministers have respected it. Yet some prime ministers are themselves uncertain about some of 
the conventions that should govern their own behaviour; Hennessy (1995:23) reports Baldwin’s view that 
‘there may be one practice called “constitutional” which is falling into desuetude and there may be another 
practice which is creeping into use but is not yet constitutional’. Hence the preference for the judgments of 
‘good chaps’ over the inflexibilities of formally stated constitutional rules.
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his/her appointment) and (hopefully) the leader of the opposition as well, public 
accountability is deemed to have been satisfied. This bare-bones approach to the 
attainment of accountability is, however, dated and no longer applies to most 
public offices. Even in those areas where confidentiality must be maintained, 
experience in some of these other offices suggests ways in which gubernatorial 
accountability could be enhanced, without confidentiality being impaired.
Indeed, a useful distinction that can be drawn between the monarchist and the 
republican modes of governance is a cultural one. Cultural differences do affect 
the ways in which heads of state relate to heads of government, but the influence 
is an indirect one. The differences between republican and monarchical regimes 
are largely matters of style: the former are more open and place more clear and 
explicit institutional limitations on their heads of state than do the latter.2 These 
differences do of course affect the nature of the relationships between the head 
of state and the head of government, but they do so in often delicate ways. Even 
republican regimes sometimes depend on good chaps when it comes to some 
affairs of state, but they do so reluctantly, as a last resort.
b) Gubernatorial position statements
Each governor should have a public ‘job description’ negotiated with his/
her head of government. Currently, the public has no way of knowing the 
full conception of the gubernatorial role held by an incumbent.3 Often, the 
incumbent him/herself must test the public acceptability of his/her conception 
through the floating of ‘trial balloons’, which inevitably attract adverse 
comments from some parliamentarians. Such a state of affairs is quite unfair 
for incumbents. A couple of incumbents (McGarvie, Sir Guy Green) have made 
behind-the-scenes attempts to assess the extent to which governors around 
Australia have respected the constitutional counselling function pioneered 40 
years ago by Hasluck, but these informal inquiries have fallen well short of the 
development of an explicit code of conduct.
Our comprehension of what our heads of state should do is shaped—usually 
tacitly—by our understanding of what States should do. The State is responsible 
for making exercises of differing kinds of authority—public and private—
comprehensible to its citizens. When the head of state can do this, s/he is 
performing an expressive role: making sense of the ways in which authority 
is being exercised. Because much of this authority is exercised in conditions 
2 Bagehot (1872:94) put the difference this way: ‘Royalty will be strong because it appeals to diffused 
feeling; and Republics weak because they appeal to the understanding.’
3 I know of at least one recent governor who totally ignored the function of constitutional counselling, the 
importance of which is stressed here.
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of confidentiality, this expressive role often has to take the form of vouching. 
Although most citizens are not allowed ‘behind the scenes’, the head of state 
can be there and can vouch for the integrity of what s/he has seen.
In a republic, an elected president would be responsible for vouching to 
interested publics that the arrangements for furthering institutional integrity 
were being properly balanced against those furthering responsiveness; an 
appointive governor would be responsible for the coordination, through the 
leadership of a governance review committee, of those myriad activities aimed 
at securing institutional integrity.
Accordingly, an important role is that of vouching to the citizenry that overall 
the integrity of our institutions is being satisfactorily balanced against the 
requirements of democratic responsiveness by the activities of our governors 
and other statutory officers (auditors- general, ombudsmen, and so on). This is 
not a role suitable for governors, for if they were responsible for such a role they 
would be in part vouching publicly for their own performance and would in 
any case be too close to the executive branch to be perceived by the citizenry as 
someone independently representing their interests in institutional integrity. A 
directly elected officer—a president—would be needed for the performance of 
this ‘vouching’ role.
As far as I am aware, ten years into the new millennium, no other contemporary 
republican democrat has yet begun theorising the developmental potentialities 
of the office of head of state. Only the monarchists have in recent years been 
celebrating that office, but their approach could hardly be described as 
developmental. It is quite the opposite; for the more intelligent monarchists, 
the lower the executive profile of the head of state, the better (Bogdanor 1995; 
Hennessy 1995). 
Indeed, there is a curious bifurcation in the contemporary literature on heads 
of state. One would have expected that discussions of the roles of heads of state 
would have attended closely to theorisations of the modern state. Anyone who 
expected this would be seriously disappointed, for the treatments of heads of 
state (of which Boyce [2008] is an outstanding example) ignore the literature on 
the modern state, and those that deal with the nature of the modern state (of 
which Thompson [2001] can serve as an equally outstanding example)4 ignore 
the roles of heads of state. Why should this be?
The short answer is that experiences in the twentieth century with heads of 
totalitarian states have so frightened us all (the outstanding statement of this 
condition of fright remains Cassirer [1963:ch. 18]) that we have considered 
4 Although both Boyce and Thompson are political scientists, in the works cited they are working within 
very different traditions: formal constitutional arrangements and the pragmatics of statecraft, respectively.
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it safest to adopt minimalist and formalist stances when confronting the 
inescapable need for heads of state. To engage in wider speculations about the 
development of new head-of-state roles has been considered altogether too 
dangerous. Yet it could turn out to be much more dangerous to attempt to sweep 
such considerations under the rug. 
As Cassirer reminds us, the non-rational and symbolic dimensions of public 
life come to the fore at times of crisis. If we continue to shun the positive roles 
that our heads of state could perform in the fiducial governance of our modern 
states, we leave ourselves open to new totalitarian initiatives. It is much safer 
to consider openly the ways in which heads of state might be brought to play 
active but constrained roles in the securing of constitutionalist regimes around 
the globe. 
c) Reviews of gubernatorial performance
Sir Paul Hasluck was Australia’s first modern governor,5 in that he set out to 
establish an ambitious gubernatorial counselling role:
I tried to satisfy myself first that the [Executive] Council had the power 
under the Constitution or a statute to make the decision recommended, 
that the recommendation was made by competent authority and that any 
preliminary enquiry or other steps required by law had taken place…
On matters which might be more controversial I would seek to satisfy 
myself that there was no conflict between the action recommended and 
any agreements, commitments or decisions of the government, and that 
respect had been paid to the conventions of the Constitution and the 
established procedures…
I was also concerned with ensuring that there was no conflict among 
my advisers…If the subject matter obviously was of interest to several 
Ministers and departments I required an assurance that there had 
been interdepartmental consultation and that the recommendation 
was supported by all those directly concerned…if I saw a possible 
conflict of policy, I would ask whether or not a recommendation had 
been considered by Cabinet and, if not, would suggest that the Prime 
Minister should be asked for his direction whether it should go before 
Cabinet. (Hasluck 1979:38–9)6
5 Winterton (2004:43) supports the assessment of McGarvie that Hasluck was ‘the founding architect of 
modern governorship in Australia’.
6 What is missing from this activist gubernatorial agenda is any explicit mention of the appropriateness of 
Executive actions under the Prerogatives power.  Review of principles that should inform such actions would 
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Of course, this activist conception has proven controversial, with some governors 
(such as McGarvie) being strong supporters and others (such as Green) equally 
strong critics. Part of the reason for these differences of opinion might rest on 
variations in the performance of such bodies as cabinet offices. Even when 
such offices are performing well, it must, however, remain a gubernatorial 
responsibility to be satisfied that this has been happening.
So Hasluck’s former political adversary, Gough Whitlam (1998:5), subsequently 
paid tribute to the value of the counsel that his government received from 
him. And a later governor-general, the formidable legal theorist Zelman Cowan 
(1985:142), went so far as to agree with Hasluck that the work ‘demanded the 
highest intellectual and personal resources available to me’. It is hard to see 
what role other than that of constitutional counselling could have required 
the full intellectual resources of a mind such as Cowan’s. Similarly, the equally 
formidable jurist Sir Henry Winneke ‘found the constitutional side of the office 
interesting, satisfying and rewarding’ (Coleman 1988:330). And McGarvie 
himself (1999:65, 68 ff.) provided an account of counselling—‘a vital part of my 
role’—that has been very much in the Hasluckian tradition—one that seemed to 
be widely performed: ‘From discussions, particularly at the annual Governors’ 
Conferences, with those holding office in recent times, it is clear that the discreet 
but influential role personified by Sir Paul Hasluck is now widely followed in 
Australia’ (McGarvie 1999:26).7
Despite McGarvie’s impressions, by no means all Australian governors have 
trod the Hasluck path. An early modifier was Governor-General Sir Ninian 
Stephen. Galligan (1991:69–70) reports that ‘[b]y Sir Ninian Stephen’s time 
this [Hasluckian] watchdog function had been largely replaced by procedures 
designed to ensure that matters coming to the Executive Council have been 
properly dealt with by the appropriate government Ministers and law offices’.
Nevertheless, even after much of the quality of the work had been enhanced 
by cabinet offices and the like, a gubernatorial responsibility should have 
remained—that of satisfying him/herself that the quality of the work done was 
at an acceptable level.
Another former governor, Sir Guy Green, has subsequently produced an elegant 
elaboration of the position of his fellow former judge Stephen. Green identifies 
three models of the gubernatorial role: (Hasluckian) interventionism; the 
‘benign mentor’ (unsurprisingly, Green’s favoured model); and the ‘mechanical 
idiot’ (which Green rejects ‘fairly summarily’, although it should be noted that 
be an important concern of each Council of State.
7 This is an excellent example of the ‘good chaps’ mystique still enveloping the gubernatorial office. 
Nothing as vulgar as an empirical study of the practices of governors appears to be possible; the public must 
be satisfied with the retrospective impressions of one former governor!
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at least one recent governor appears to have conformed to this model).8 Green 
does, however, give qualified support to McGarvie’s impressions. Reporting on 
an informal survey of governors that he conducted in the late 1990s, Green 
(2006b) noted that ‘[g]overnors or the Secretariats of Executive Councils in 
Australia do in practice exercise an effective monitoring function by raising 
significant queries with the Ministers or departments presenting items to the 
Council. In some jurisdictions this occurs “very frequently”. It remains unclear, 
however, just how the majority of governors distributed themselves between the 
interventionist and the benign mentor models. Indeed, one well-placed observer 
has gone so far as to claim that the distinction is now ‘a distinction without a 
difference’ (Smith 2005:161). Whether or not this is an accurate criticism, an 
important issue remains, for it is yet to be determined just what should be the 
boundaries of gubernatorial concern with the activities of the executive branch.
If a Hasluckian constitutional counsellor role is deemed appropriate, a governance 
review council/committee should regularly assess performance in this role. 
On Hasluck’s own account of this role presented above, it nicely complements 
that of the ombudsman, with the governor protecting institutional integrity 
at the political level and the ombudsman doing so at the administrative level. 
A governor who played this role could thus be accorded membership of the 
governance review council/committee the creation of which in each of our nine 
jurisdictions was recommended by the NISA project. 
d) The need for a council of state
If a governance review council/committee were to be responsible for work of 
such political sensitivity, it would need to be protected by a body such as the 
Irish Council of State. While the NISA report recognised the need for political 
champions to take up the reforms it was recommending, none has yet appeared, 
and such champions are highly likely to remain absent while our style of 
partisan politics remains unreformed. The introduction of a council of state 
(with a membership along Irish lines) could begin to discipline our parties in 
new ways, for such bodies would offer new pathways of advancement for the 
more consensually minded of our political leaders.
Councils of state are curious chameleon-like bodies. All states that differentiate 
heads of state from heads of government—and they are a considerable majority 
in the modern world—possess some such body to handle relations between 
these two centres of authority. None, however, has yet emerged to take a leading 
role in securing the integrity of all the major institutions of governance. Some, 
8 As each governor still remains free to define the role as s/he pleases, it would be unfair to identify the one 
who on my information conforms to the ‘mechanical idiot’ model.
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such as the British Privy Council, have fallen into desuetude;9 others, such as 
the French Conseil d’Etat, have become specialised in one area of governance 
(in the French case, constitutional and administrative law). And some, such as 
the Irish Council of State, have been designed to exercise very little authority. 
Nevertheless, the Irish Council of State possesses a membership that is well 
suited to the securing of institutional integrity at the highest levels, for it brings 
together the heads of the three recognised branches, together with a wide range 
of community representatives.10
In the Australian case, it might be objected that we already possess our own 
variations on the privy council theme, in the executive councils that exist in 
each jurisdiction. These councils have, however, in modern times become so 
captured by our partisan systems that it is impossible to envisage them playing 
a broad fiducial governance role. Since the Hasluck innovations, however, they 
all possess the potentiality of supporting a governor with strong interests in the 
integrity of government programs.
In approaching these tasks of fiduciality assurance, councils of state will benefit 
from their composition as collegial bodies. As Baylis (1989)11 suggests, such 
bodies are particularly well suited to the furtherance of two of the ideals that 
Ackerman proposes for a regime of constrained parliamentarianism: democratic 
governance and integrity of public institutions. Indeed, the widening of the scope 
of our inquiry from the ‘-cracy’ on which Baylis focuses (his entire analysis rests 
on a fundamental distinction between collegiality and monocratic leadership) to 
one that encompasses ‘-archy’ (as in the above distinction between monarchical 
and polyarchical regimes) allows us to move beyond the findings of Baylis. Take, 
9 Over many years, the Privy Council served as a model for many constitutional designers. For example, 
it provided a model for the Australian executive councils that are discussed below. More spectacularly, the 
American founding fathers vested the famous ‘advise and consent’ powers in the Senate in the hope that 
this might encourage it to emulate the House of Lords as the seat of some of the powers of the Privy Council 
(Sundquist 1992:37, 61, 313).
10 The membership of the Irish Council of State is as follows: Prime Minister; Deputy Prime Minister; Chief 
Justice; President of the High Court; Presiding Officers of the two Houses of Parliament; Attorney-General; 
any former president, prime minister or chief justice willing to serve; up to seven presidential nominees. For 
reasons stated elsewhere in this monograph, it would be highly desirable to grant leaders of the opposition 
seats on each council of state. Republican reformers have been slow to perceive the great potential of the Irish 
arrangements—which were after all fashioned in the 1930s by a great statesman confronting a situation not 
unlike our own—because they have assumed that the current bicephalous arrangement that we possess must 
disappear, so that we would have a single officer, a president, as head of state. As the Irish President does not 
have the authority to perform the functions of Australian governors, her office and the Council of State that 
supports it have been incorrectly deemed irrelevant to Australia (see Power 2005, 2006). 
11 Baylis’s (1989:9–10) important work is explicitly concerned only with executive branches. Nevertheless, 
the work throws much light on the strengths and weaknesses of collegial ways of proceeding, and this light 
can assist us to deepen our understanding of how a collegial body that headed up an integrity branch should 
proceed. The most important lesson is one that carries a strong caution. Collegial bodies are particularly 
well suited to the tackling of technically complex problems that require heavy support from specialised 
bureaucracies, especially those embedded in influential policy communities. This is all very well, but the 
synergies that link collegial deliberative bodies and their bureaucrat officials strengthen a tendency that both 
usually exhibit strongly: a tendency to secrecy and insensitivity to outside criticism.
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for example, his characterisation of monocratic leadership as being one mainly 
of symbolic reassurance (not unlike the role that used to be claimed for heads of 
state). When we consider the function of symbolic reassurance within the wider 
framework of a polyarchical regime, we can see that the function breaks down 
into two quite distinct parts: direct and indirect. When a head of government 
provides direct reassurance, s/he is referring to the performance of institutions 
under his/her direct control. When a head of state provides indirect assurance, 
s/he is vouching for the integrity of the institutions involved, many of which 
are not under his/her direct control.
e) Public ‘vouching’ for the integrity of council 
of state processes
The task of publicly vouching for the integrity of the work of these collegial 
bodies should not be the responsibility of any of the ‘working members’. If the 
proposed new bodies were to earn reputations for trustworthiness, they would 
need to have spokespeople who could regularly vouch for the integrity of their 
proceedings. And, if allegations of conflicts of interest were to be avoided, such 
spokespeople should be independent of those whose work was being vouched 
for. An independent chair of a council of state would be well suited to this task. 
f) Directly elected ‘voucher’
If public trust in these new institutional arrangements were to be optimised, the 
‘voucher’ would need to be directly elected. A publicly elected ‘voucher’ could 
appropriately be dubbed ‘president’. If the new institutional arrangements 
came to be widely seen as helping to increase public trust in our institutions 
of governance, the spokesperson would probably have to be elected. In the 
Australian federal system, it could well turn out to be the case that the national 
president could come to chair several (or even all) of the state/territory councils 
of state as well. If this were to happen, a more effective form of federalism could 
emerge. There would certainly be sufficient work to justify the continuation of 
a strengthened bicephalous configuration of head-of-state roles. 
g) Two forms of politics
Although many of the more perceptive writers on democratic governance 
have differentiated two forms of politics—a ‘lower’ and a ‘higher’—the 
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fundamental distinction made by Thompson (2001) best suits the purposes of 
this monograph. Her characterisation of the ‘masculine principle’ of politics 
closely resembles that of partisan contestation in Australia—one that ‘employs 
power, with reason, to meet immediate objectives’. The ‘feminine principle’, on 
the other hand, ‘is attached to traditions that maintain the strength of social 
affection across communities…It is linked with creativity, the unconscious, 
interiorization and mystery’ (Thompson 2001:103)12. This differentiation is 
valuable in the present context,13 for it asserts that both ‘principles’—in the 
terms used throughout this monograph: the partisan and the fiducial—are 
essential to good governance, for they function ‘in a distinctive equilibrium and 
[are] dependent upon maintaining a fine balance’ (Thompson 2001:102).
Such a ‘feminine’ president would not be, as is frequently asserted, apolitical or 
‘above’ politics, but would be involved in a form of politics different from the 
partisan form that decides the composition of the government of the day. The 
boundaries between the two forms of government would have to be negotiated—
and continually renegotiated—in the council of state. The mainstream view that 
the head of state should be ‘above’ politics stems from fears that a directly elected 
head might challenge the head of government on major policies (Power 2008a). 
While this is undoubtedly an important issue, it is one that now confronts every 
one of the ‘semi-presidential’ regimes—about one-quarter of all the national 
regimes in the contemporary world (Elgie 2004; Elgie and Moestrup 2007, 
2008).14 Some of these regimes—such as the half-dozen that have developed 
‘corrective’ head-of-state roles not unlike those introduced into Australia by 
Hasluck (Siaroff 2003)—should offer some relevant lessons for us.15
12 From a quite different feminist direction, Eisler (1987: 105) has introduced the term ‘gylany’, which bears 
strong resemblances to Thompson’s conception of balance.
13 On one perceptive reading of Ackerman (Choudhry and Mount 2006), a similar distinction—between 
‘normal’ and ‘constitutive’ politics—is made by him, and is, as is argued in this monograph, central to his 
rationale for serial referenda.
14 There is one important lesson for comparative governance studies that should be noted here. Writing two 
decades ago, just before the explosion in the number of semi-presidential regimes, even so capable a scholar as 
Baylis was dismissive of the importance of such regimes. Admittedly, he devoted considerable attention to the 
French Fifth Republic, which he was content to classify as presidential. The only other regime of this nature 
to receive even the slightest attention was Finland, which Baylis (1989:128) passed over as an uninteresting 
‘hybrid’.
15 On 17 April 2008, I published an article in the Melbourne Age, in which I identified these regimes: 
Ireland, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The article attracted no interest. The surprising 
lack of Australian interest in semi-presidential regimes continues. In the just published volume The Australian 
Study of Politics (Rhodes 2009), I am the only one of 37 contributors to mention such regimes. This paucity 
of citing of course reflects the lack of interest in the wider political science community, so that the eminent 
comparatist LeslIe Holmes (2009) does not mention these regimes in his characteristically thorough survey of 
Australian contributions to his specialty.
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h) A pathway to the republic
The development of the two separate roles of constitutional counsellor and 
of ‘voucher’ would continue the current bicephalous practices, but would do 
so in ways that offered a politically feasible pathway to a republic. As long 
as the republican movement remains divided between the selectionists (who 
value most highly the constitutional counselling work that has been performed 
by at least some of our governors) and the direct electionists (who favour a 
presidential conception of the office of head of state), the attainment of the 
republic will probably continue to elude us. It is only when each side is given 
what they most value that the passage of a referendum on the republic could 
begin to appear feasible.
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4. Conclusion: republican measures 
for a republican future
For forms of government let fools contest
Whate’er is best administer’d is best
— Alexander Pope
Elegant in its cynicism as this couplet is, it ultimately fails, because the quality 
of administration usually depends in significant part on the nature of the form 
of government—the regime—under which it functions.
Because of the ubiquity of imputation, the republican mode of governing is 
always difficult. The republican might succeed in making explicit some long-
tacit norm, only to find it slipping back into another assumptive world. Take, 
for example, the phenomenon of regulation, which is always a concern of 
governments, but a concern that has moved to centre stage in the contemporary 
world according to one recent perceptive account (Braithwaite 2008). After 
some time considering the phenomenon of modern regulation to be best 
approached under the rubric ‘the regulatory state’, Braithwaite now deems it 
more appropriate to allow the State to recede into the background of regulatory 
capitalism. Why? Because governments are now politically pressured to regulate 
the activities of their own agencies (Braithwaite 2008:21), and many activities 
are being regulated by global bodies with remits wider than any nation-state. 
So, Braithwaite argues, it is no longer appropriate to have a core governance 
definition focused on the nation-state. 
In this, of course, Braithwaite differs sharply from Keane, with his core concept 
of monitory democracy. To place capitalism at the centre of the definitional 
field is, however, to marginalise fiducial political action—the performance of 
governance that provides a genuine basis for strong and continuing public 
trust. Braithwaite is after all not averse to endorsing institutional untidiness,1 
for this can provide opportunities for ‘interstitial freedom’: the phenomenon 
that can be observed when the citizenry uncovers openings for free action in 
the interstices of governing institutions—openings that were not intended by 
the designers of those institutions. While no liberal republican can be hostile 
to interstitial freedom—for we all deserve all the breaks that come our way in 
the modern world—s/he cannot be content with the solely accidental and the 
1 At one point, he expresses a preference for ‘many semi-autonomous powers recursively checking one 
another, rather than a few autonomous branches of governance’ (Braithwaite 1997:312).
Fiducial.Governance
58
contingent as bases for fiducial governance. Such governance does require our 
very best efforts in institutional design. Freedom that is based on such design 
work is more secure than the interstitial form.
In this concluding section of the monograph, then, I am unashamedly political 
in my arguments. I shall take it as a given that a jurisdiction has proceeded well 
down my order of institutional reform set out in the preceding section. In this 
way, I hope to show most clearly the ways in which a fully republican regime 
could effectively tackle the tasks of fiducial governance. I shall therefore be 
working my way through the problems identified in Section 2, but doing so in 
reverse order, so that I shall be able to conclude with a discussion of the ways 
in which a republican version of the regime of constrained parliamentarianism 
could strengthen our democracy.2
Armed with the set of new and rejuvenated institutional mechanisms introduced 
in the preceding section, we can now return to the components of the expanded 
framework of constrained parliamentarianism. This time, however, we can be 
much briefer, for as they are presently constituted, the several components 
share the relatively small number of problems that would be ameliorated by the 
introduction of these new mechanisms.
a) Viable role for a contemporary head of state
To place the roles of a contemporary head of state in the context of constrained 
parliamentarianism is to identify clearly the unsuitability of the monarchical 
style of governing. If a regime is to be able to respond fully to the demands of 
polyarchical rule, it needs to demonstrate the capacity to handle ‘multi-valued 
choices’ (Stewart 1974). Because of its distinctively different politics, a council 
of state would be able to develop this capacity in ways well beyond the reach of 
partisan contestation. 
In further developing this capacity for fiducial politics, each council of state 
would be building on the work that has been accomplished over the years as 
our parliaments have struggled to establish viable committee systems, for these 
often display a consensual politics close to the fiducial. Indeed, over time the 
activities of a council of state could have the effect of strengthening still more 
the committee systems of its parliament, because of the ways in which it will 
be softening the nature of partisan contestation and indeed changing the very 
nature of our parties. As this transformation of our parties continued, the council 
2 In a companion monograph that I am preparing with Harshan Kumarasingham, we shall be arguing that 




of state could be expected to withdraw in the face of stronger parliamentary 
committee work. It is in the very nature of fiducial governance that the head-of-
state roles are not primarily those of doing, but rather of assuring him/herself 
that appropriate action is being taken somewhere in the system of governance. 
As the Hasluck approach considered above indicates, the holder of a head–
of-state office has only to intervene directly when s/he discerns faults in the 
performance of others.
It could be expected that each council of state would take its lead from its head-
of-state leaders and would be equally circumspect in respecting the integrity 
of the other branches of governance whose representatives would of course be 
participating in its deliberations.
b) Serial referenda
If the proposed councils of state were to commit themselves to the principles 
of serial referenda on matters of high fiducial policy, the whole culture 
of constitutional reform in Australia could be transformed. If referendum 
proposals were to be generated by fiducially minded partisan leaders meeting 
in collegial deliberations, the citizenry could be expected to view them more 
favourably than it has in the past, when reform proposals were generated for the 
most part by remote commissions of lawyers. And if the serial nature of these 
referendum exercises were to be institutionalised along the lines recommended 
by Ackerman, their very familiarity could enhance their prospects of success.
c) Integrity of major institutions
The reform program here proposed provides answers to the two questions that 
have most perplexed the advocates of greater integrity in our institutions of 
governance. The first of these is the discovery of political champions. For the 
reasons already stated, these are unlikely to emerge from our current, unreformed 
democratic regime. A directly elected president would, however, be well placed 
to perform the champion’s role. The second question is the identification of 
those who would be well placed to undertake the work of comprehensive regime 
design. As we have seen, the governance review councils/committees proposed 
by the integrity advocates would have too narrow a brief to be able to undertake 
reviews of governance arrangements tout court. For this work of comprehensive 
review to be undertaken, the much more broadly constituted councils of state 
that I recommend would be admirably suited.
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With these arrangements firmly in place, the reformed regime would be well 
equipped to deal creatively with the problem that is always the most vexing 
for any democratic regime: how to devise extra-constitutional practices that 
can overcome the policy rigidities caused by the intersection of the formalisms 
of constitutional phrasing, on the one hand, and the inflexibilities of partisan 
contestation, on the other.
When the head of government and the leader of the opposition are required 
to negotiate the scope of partisan contestation in a collegial setting oriented 
towards fiduciality, it becomes possible for that same collegial body to work on 
the overall design of the regime’s constitutional arrangements. 
d) Securing human rights
While the dialogue model of securing human rights through a charter is an 
attractive one, in none of the regimes that has adopted this model has collegial 
dialogue been attained. And the reason for this lacuna is clear enough. Only 
in the setting provided by a properly constituted council of state could the 
dialogues essential to the charter model of securing human rights be conducted. 
The awkwardness inevitably associated with the functions of the attorney-
general—attempting to perform non-partisan functions in a context of continuing 
partisan contestation—would be removed. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, it 
could be deemed appropriate to seat this officer (and possibly his/her shadow 
as well) on the council of state—a context for the discharge of his/her long-
established quasi- judicial functions that would avoid the difficulties caused by 
partisan rigidities.
As the listing of current deficiencies discussed above clearly indicates, the 
design of a regime that reconciled the need for human rights to be entrenched 
in ways that respected the ultimate role of the Parliament in determining the 
scope of those rights is one that typically falls short because of the rigidities of 
partisan contestation. The reformed regime here recommended would provide a 
way through such difficulties, for it would be the fiducial politics of the council 
of state, rather than the partisan politics of the Executive, that would determine 
the design of the human rights regime. Party leaders would continue to play 
the leading roles in this work, but they would do so in a collegial setting that 
would impose new, but more flexible, disciplines on them. In such a setting, 
strong differences of opinion would continue to express themselves, with 
conservatives opposed to progressives on the definition of the proper scope of 
the rights to be protected (social and economic as well as political and civil?), 




Along this dimension of constrained parliamentarianism, a distinctively new 
style of problem tackling—what we could term dialoguing—would emerge as 
each council of state wrestled with the design of a fiducial regime that genuinely 
respected human rights. 
e) Independent judiciary
Under this heading we encounter an apparent paradox. Surely, it could be 
objected, the involvement of the judiciary in the politics of a council of state would 
compromise the independence of the judiciary? The answer to this important 
question is most conveniently phrased as follows: if the representatives of the 
judiciary were able to participate in deliberations about the boundaries around 
partisan contestation that should be observed, this would make it not more 
but less likely that the judiciary might in the future find itself in the middle of 
partisan disputes. And the office of head of state would be much better suited to 
act as the guardian of judicial independence than the attorney-general, whose 
partisan commitments might continue seriously to weaken his/her capacity to 
act in this way.
We could expect considerable variation between jurisdictions in the ways in 
which the leaders of the judicial branch decided to handle their representation 
in the council of state. Some, like their Irish colleagues,3 would be relaxed about 
direct participation;4 others might prefer to be represented by surrogates, such 
as retired judges, who could regularly consult with current officeholders. 
This discussion has introduced a further important dimension to the work of 
the proposed councils of state: the boundaries of the dialoguing activity would 
have to be negotiated—and continually renegotiated—in ways that respected 
the integrity of the established roles of those coming from other branches and 
from civil society. As I note in the Appendix, a recent Senate Committee report 
(Parliament of Australia 2009b) could provide firm grounds for the establishment 
of a new body (which I have tentatively called a judicial selection and protection 
committee of a council of state). Such a body would be well placed to address 
the issues as the political dimensions of inter-branch dialogue.
3 And in New South Wales? In that jurisdiction, the activist Chief Justice has been strongly advocating a 
stronger judicial role in the securing of institutional integrity (Spigelman 2004, 2005).
4 According to the foremost authority on Australian constitutional law, such representation would 
ultimately require constitutional change to be in order (Zines 2008: 262 — on judges appointed as personae 
designatae).  In the meantime, until the climate for constitutional reform improved, the views of the judiciary 
might best be presented by retired judges serving on councils of state, although serving judges with strong 
personal interests in broad issues of governance could well participate.
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f) Professional public service
A similar point can be made under this heading. While the head of the public 
service in each jurisdiction is well suited to protect the integrity of the public 
service, s/he needs high-level collegial support in discharging this heavy 
responsibility. While much of this collegial support would be provided by the 
proposed merit and equity committee of the council of state, the council itself—
and its presidential leader—would be able to provide the democratic legitimacy 
needed to underpin the deliberations of the committee. 
g) Strong upper house
Of all the institutions that will be affected by the proposed reform program, 
this is the one whose future shape will be most unpredictable, because the most 
powerful influences on it will be indirect. The involvement of the parties in the 
head-of-state election campaigns will transform them and in the process shift 
the balance between the styles of politics characteristic of the two chambers—
and will shift the balance very much in the direction of the upper house style. 
In Australia, the Senate has distinguished itself in the past four decades 
through its development of the most impressive committee system of any of 
our parliaments. It has been able to do this because it has for most of that time 
not been under the control of the governing party. Its further development 
over the next four decades could be heavily shaped by the emergence of a 
regime of fiducial governance, for such an emergence would open up new areas 
of investigation and policy development free of the stranglehold of partisan 
contestation.
h) Federal structure
There is one important assumption that Galligan shared with every other writer 
of the 1990s that should at this point be again questioned. This is the ‘merger 
assumption’, which uncritically posits that the current bicephalous arrangement 
(monarch plus governor) should be replaced with a single office. What, however, 
if we come to agree that a) the gubernatorial role that was developed by Hasluck 
and subsequently celebrated by former governor McGarvie is valuable and 
should be retained and indeed strengthened; and b) the wider community role 
currently being attempted by the monarchical head of state should be developed 




Such a leader would be well placed to introduce processes of serial referenda, 
along the lines recommended by Ackerman. The justification of our federal 
system would be much stronger if the experience of referenda on constitutional 
reform were to take a turn in a more positive direction. At present, as we have 
seen, champions of an Australian federal republic such as Galligan have had to 
place too much trust in positive referenda results of long ago.
While the reforms proposed will have a rejuvenating influence on the Australian 
federal system, the roles that the president might play in state/territory 
jurisdictions will vary. In the president’s home state, it would be most likely 
that the Commonwealth pattern of gubernatorial constitutional counselling 
and presidential vouching would be replicated. In other jurisdictions, however, 
different arrangements might be needed. In some, the president might be able 
to nominate an agent—such as the chairperson of an important parliamentary 
committee or the presiding officer of an upper house.—to perform the vouching 
function. In others, especially where the constitutional counselling function 
was securely established in a cabinet secretariat, the gubernatorial incumbent 
might be entrusted with the vouching function.
It is at this juncture that the councils of state would encounter the institution 
with which the most important jurisdictional issues would have to be negotiated: 
the executive branch-oriented Council of Australian Governments. Just as the 
head of government and the leader of the opposition would be expected in 
each council of state to negotiate (and continually renegotiate) the boundaries 
of partisan contestation in that jurisdiction, so representatives of the councils 
of state and of Australian governments would have to engage in parallel 
negotiations and renegotiations, quite possibly through each council’s sectoral 
peak bodies chamber.
A genuine differentiation of the realms of partisan and fiducial politics, of 
the kind that could be delivered through councils of state, would permit the 
systematic development of coherent intergovernmental programs. It could even 
result in the better integration of the ‘dual constitutional culture’ (Galligan 
1995:50), for it would facilitate the determination of those programs that 
could be freed of the heavier constraints of partisan contestation. Much heavy 
intergovernmental negotiation would remain, but it would be coordinated by 
the several new monitory branches through their respective councils of state.
i) Parliamentary democracy 
The insertion of a democratically elected president into a regime of constrained 
parliamentarianism would for the first time allow intelligible coordination to be 
achieved among the several constraints operating on the Executive. In this way, 
Fiducial.Governance
64
the accountability of a parliamentary-based executive would be strengthened, 
and with it the trustworthiness of all the major institutions of governance. 
Democracy (in its widely accepted Schumpeterian sense5) is essential to any 
form of effective governance in the contemporary world, but it could be 
rejuvenated in a regime of fiducial governance. The recognition of another 
form of democratic politics—to sit alongside but ultimately to defer to the 
familiar partisan form—could rejuvenate our parties. If the parties came to be 
seen as central participants in fiducial politics, they would become much more 
attractive to those whose interests were not those that readily lent themselves 
to partisan regimentation and contestation. (While this transformation of our 
parties would have the most immediate consequences for our upper houses and 
their committees, which I have noted above, in the longer term they would 
also begin to exercise beneficial influences on lower houses and their committee 
systems as well.)
With the establishment of councils of state in each of our jurisdictions, then, 
new balances will be struck in the ways in which representative democracy 
relates to fiducial governance. The deliberations of each of these councils will 
provide leadership for each monitory branch. Through these deliberations, the 
dialogues essential to the integrity of our major institutions and to the protection 
of basic human rights will be effectively conducted. Because these dialogues 
will establish firm boundaries around the fields of partisan disputation, judges 
and senior public servants will be able to participate in these dialogues without 
placing their independence in jeopardy. The institutions most beset by partisan 
contestation—sub-national governments and upper houses—will find more 
effective ways of coordinating their fiducial activities, while retaining the 
capacity of serving as arenas for vigorous partisan debate, all the more vigorous 
because it will be more clearly focused.
5 Schumpeter (1954:269) defined democracy as follows: ‘An institutional arrangement for arriving at 




A consolidated council of state agenda listing1
While each council of state will have to develop its own distinctive agenda, 
none will be able to avoid the following set of issues that are especially close to 
the cause of fiducial governance. It should be recognised, however, that much 
work would have to be done before this could begin to address any of these 
items. It is for this reason that it would be prudent to begin with an interim 
committee (as recommended in Note 1 on this page). 
For example, the very functions of the council might well be shaped by its 
foundation membership (and vice versa) and some of these membership 
issues would most appropriately be considered after the heads of state and 
of government had convened initial exploratory meetings of interests likely 
to figure prominently in the work of the constituent chambers (which would 
number three if, as suggested above, the lead of the Indigenous community were 
to be followed).
Were any government to pursue seriously the strategy I have here recommended, 
the constitutional consequences would of course ultimately be considerable. 
No government, however, should be too quickly deterred from taking the first 
steps, for the full implementation of my reform program would take many years. 
All I am here trying to do is set forth a sense of long-term direction for the 
ways our governments might reform themselves. I have been encouraged in 
this enterprise by the acute observation of one well-placed observer, John Uhr 
(2009:132), who recently commented on the ‘remarkably adaptive Australian 
parliamentary system’.
Agenda.item.1:.functions.of.the.council
Form and coordinate the activities of the council’s several specialist committees.
Provide a forum for determination of the scope of partisan political competition.
1 In the interests of simplicity, I have throughout this monograph referred to ‘councils of state’ as though 
they were already established. In practice, of course, agreement-in-principle to proceed, which had been 
reached between a governor and head of government, would be followed initially by the establishment of a 
working group or interim committee to work on such topics as those covered under the first two headings 
in the listing below. Any decisions taken by these interim bodies would, however, have to be ratified by the 




One reason why each interim committee would find the three-chambers 
structure attractive would be their suitability for engaging in wide-ranging 
consultations to identify those functions that were central to citizen perceptions 
of the nature of fiducial governance. Some of the more obvious functions—each 
to be developed by an appropriate committee—are listed below.
Agenda.item.2:.membership.of.the.council
Comment.
Those councils that had decided to follow the lead recently provided by 
Indigenous interests and adopted the three-chamber structure would have to 
move on to determine (at least on an interim basis) the composition of constituent 
chambers. 
I have above indicated some of the interests that should be considered for 
inclusion in the three national chambers
• chamber 1: national peak bodies (representatives from the three established 
branches of government, from the National Congress of Australia’s First 
Peoples) 
• chamber 2: sectoral peak bodies (representatives from the Council of 
Australian Governments)
• chamber 3: local community and individual representatives (representatives 
from the Australian Collaboration—see  Section 1(i above—and from 
organisations representing interests not specifically covered by the 
Collaboration (for example, women, the aged, the disabled2). 
In approaching the issues surrounding its own composition and structure, the 
interim committee for the council of state will have to discriminate between 
those institutions that are obvious inclusions (such as the representatives of the 
three established branches of governance) and those that would probably be 
included (which might need to be reviewed before a decision could be taken on 
the nature of its representation).3
2 Some of the interests formally represented under one of the ‘umbrellas’ of the Australian Collaboration 
might require separate consideration eg the Muslim community, from which a persuasive case for an Islamic 
constitutionalism rooted in the realm of the sacred has recently emerged (Aly 2007).
3 A good example of this latter ‘contingent’ category would be the Council of the Order of Australia. Although 
this council (and the awards it recommended) were restructured in modern times, so that knighthoods were no 
longer bestowed, it retained many characteristics that were more suitable to a monarchical than a republican 
regime. The structure of its awards closely reflect the class structure, with those of the highest status being 
reserved for ‘good chaps’; excessive secrecy surrounds its decision-making processes; and its lack of public 
accountability means that the severe biases its awards display are never publicly debated. The citizenry has 
never had much say in the affairs of the council; the awards descend on the population twice a year with 
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It would be relatively straightforward for any interim committee operating at 
the state/territory level to modify these arrangements to suit their particular 
circumstances. For example, one or more of the established branches could bid 
to take over parts of the monitory function (for a bid of this kind emanating 




This of course is a body similar to that recommended by the NISA project. It is 
here presented, however, as a committee and not a council, for it would draw 
the needed political champions from the council of state, of which it would be 
one of the principal committees. It could well turn out in many jurisdictions 
to be the primus inter pares of the committees, for its concerns would lie at the 
heart of fiducial governance. To take a most important field, this Committee 
would have the responsibility of developing recommendations for its Council 
of State on the rules and standards, if any, that should constrain the exercise of 




In this committee, on which representatives of all three of the established 
branches would be especially keen to be represented, the necessary inter-branch 
dialogue—called for but not made adequate provision for in all regimes that 
have to date established charter arrangements—would begin. Such dialogue 




The 1997 Statement of Independence of the Australian Chief Justices—which 
impressed Patapan (2000:167) as ‘remarkable’ but unclear in its provenance—
precious little impact. It is time that the need for awards is reviewed and, if their continuation is deemed 




provides ample justification for the establishment of such a collegial body, which 
might in time morph into a judicial services commission: ‘To enable the judiciary 
to achieve its objectives and perform its functions, it is essential that judges be 
chosen on the basis of proven competence, integrity and independence’ (Chief 
Justices of Australia 1997).
In some societies, the appointment of judges by, with the consent of or after 
consultation with, a judicial services commission has been seen as a means of 
ensuring that those chosen judges are appropriate for the purpose. Where a 
judicial services commission is adopted, it should include representatives from 
the higher judiciary and the independent legal profession as a means of ensuring 
that judicial competence, integrity and independence are maintained. 
In the absence of a judicial services commission, the procedures for the 
appointment of judges should be clearly defined and formalised and information 
about them should be available to the public. 
Indeed, a Senate Committee has very recently argued along similar—indeed 
rather republican—lines:
The committee recommends that when the appointment of a federal 
judicial officer is announced the Attorney-General should make public 
the number of nominations and applications received for each vacancy.
If the government or department prepared a short-list of candidates for 
any appointment, the number of people on the list should also be made 
public.
The committee recommends that the process for appointments to the 
High Court should be principled and transparent. The committee 
recommends that the Attorney-General should adopt a process that 
includes advertising vacancies widely and should confirm that selection 
is based on merit and should detail the selection criteria that constitute 
merit for appointment to the High Court.
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth government 
establish a federal judicial commission modelled on the Judicial 




Establishment of this collegial body would give belated recognition to the two-
decades-old recommendations of the report of the Review of Public Service 
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Personnel Management in Victoria. As the much more recent argument of Podger 
(2007) indicates, such a collegial presence is sorely needed at the apex of each of 
our regimes. Only through the effective functioning of such bodies could citizen 




Clearly, the new councils would share important interests with the existing 
Council for the Order of Australia. Whether the existing Council for the Order 
of Australia should be reconstituted as a committee of the national council of 
state will be a controversial issue best left without further comment in this 
monograph (see Note 3 of this Section). It should be noted, however, that 
honours are important to any conception of fiducial politics ‘for what they 
signal about the values and good works that matter’ (Braithwaite 2008:125). 
And sometimes those who should be honoured are those usually shunned by 
established honours councils, such as those non-partisans who have stimulated 




Some years ago, I persuaded the Commission on Constitutional Reform in 
Victoria that it was desirable for the members of the newly reconstituted upper 
house (the Legislative Council) to form regional committees on which they 
would deliberate with municipal representatives and other community figures.4 
Unsurprisingly, the government of Steve Bracks ignored this recommendation. 
In this new context, however, such an arrangement could with benefit be 
modified for introduction at the national and state/territory levels. For example, 
senators and municipal councillors who were able to secure seats on their 
respective state/territory councils of state would be especially well placed to 
serve as linkages between the differing spheres of governance.








While it would be up to each council of state to determine the role it would 
like the national head of state to play in its deliberations, this would be an 
issue of considerable interest to the national council and the head of state him/
herself. It is not inconceivable that the councils in some jurisdictions would 
make provision for a new ‘vouching’ officer, such as the chairperson of an 
important parliamentary committee or the presiding officer of an upper house. 
If this were to occur, the relations of such an officer with the national-level 
‘voucher’—the president—would need to be carefully negotiated between the 
councils concerned.
Another important responsibility that could be placed on this committee would 
be that of developing recommendations on the development of proper relations 
between Australian councils and international bodies.5 Once fiducially oriented 
councils of state came into existence (either through institutional innovation, as 
would have to be the case in Australia, or through the reorientation of existing 
councils, as in many existing semi-presidential regimes), they would naturally 
seek to establish linkages with other similarly oriented councils. Although such 
interactions would become evident first at regional levels, it would not be long 
before their relevance to global concerns would come under the attention of 
bodies such as the United Nations. While this is a topic that I shall take up in 
the companion essay, it is one that will increasingly demand the attention of 
governance practitioners long after I have departed the scene.
Agenda.item.10:.design.of.the.reform.program.
Design the constitutional reform program, with particular attention to the 
sequencing of proposals to be submitted to the citizenry through serial referenda.
Comment
While much worthwhile work can be accomplished before constitutional reforms 
are attempted, ultimately popular referenda will be needed. The approach of 
governance leaders will, however, be far from minimalist orthodoxy, for they 
5 This important issue is treated at somewhat greater length in the epilogue to the companion essay.
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will welcome public deliberation on a sequence of reform proposals. They will 
be fortified by the knowledge that their commitment to the fiducial cause will 
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